Autonomous System
AS9021
Last fetched
AS9021 is operated by ISNET - Is Net Elektonik Bilgi Uretim Dagitim Ticaret ve Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S., registered in TR, and announces 155 prefixes to 10 BGP neighbours. AS9021 has a reputation score of 8.1 (REPUTABLE); 4 of its 157,184 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 155
- BGP neighbours
- 10
- RPKI ROAs
- 190
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,086
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 8
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 7
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 3
- 90.158.0.0/23
- 90.158.0.0/22
- 90.158.3.0/24
- 90.158.8.0/24
- 90.158.15.0/24
- 90.158.16.0/24
- 90.158.18.0/24
- 90.158.19.0/24
- 90.158.24.0/24
- 90.158.26.0/24
- 90.158.28.0/24
- 90.158.29.0/24
- 90.158.30.0/24
- 90.158.31.0/24
- 90.158.0.0/18
- 90.158.32.0/24
- 90.158.33.0/24
- 90.158.36.0/24
- 90.158.37.0/24
- 90.158.39.0/24
- 90.158.41.0/24
- 90.158.43.0/24
- 90.158.44.0/24
- 90.158.45.0/24
- 90.158.46.0/24
Signals
- satellite-networkRoutes over a satellite access network rather than terrestrial links.
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 190 ROAs.
- 185.237.68.0/22 · max length /22
- 185.237.68.0/23 · max length /23
- 185.237.70.0/23 · max length /23
- 185.66.124.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.66.125.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.98.0.0/19 · max length /19
- 212.98.0.0/20 · max length /20
- 212.98.1.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.98.16.0/21 · max length /21
- 212.98.16.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS9021.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 157,184
- Threat-listed addresses
- 4
- Threat density
- 0.0025 %
- Routed prefixes
- 154
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 BGP neighbours.
- VIASAT-SP-BACKBONE - ViaSat,Inc. · AS7155
- TTNet - Turk Telekomunikasyon Anonim Sirketi · AS9121
- PAYTEN-AS - PAYTEN TEKNOLOJI ANONIM SIRKETI · AS28781
- PROLEXIC-TECHNOLOGIES-DDOS-MITIGATION-NETWORK - Akamai Technologies, Inc. · AS32787
- TELLCOM-AS - Superonline Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S. · AS34984
- ANADOLUSIGORTA-AS - Anadolu Anonim Turk Sigorta Sirketi · AS34996
- TSKB - Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi Anonim Sirketi · AS49027
- ALB - PUSULA YATIRIM MENKUL DEGERLER A.S. · AS51321
- ISYATIRIM-MD - Is Yatirim Menkul Degerler A.S. · AS51739
- YF-AS - YATIRIM FINANSMAN MENKUL DEGERLER ANONIM SIRKETI · AS60056
Reputation
8.1reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS9021 (ISNET - Is Net Elektonik Bilgi Uretim Dagitim Ticaret ve Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S., TR) has a reputation score of 75.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 27 Aug 2002 03:27:17 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@is.net.tr
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS9021 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.