Autonomous System

AS9183

Last fetched Tue, 20 Oct 2026 20:57:14 GMT

AS9183 is operated by UNSPECIFIED - Robert Bosch Gesellschaft mit Beschraenkter Haftung, registered in DE, and announces 265 prefixes to 2 BGP neighbours. AS9183 has a reputation score of 20.5 (SUSPICIOUS); 1 of its 67,584 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.

Nutrition Label

Routing footprint

Announced prefixes: 265
BGP neighbours: 2
RPKI ROAs: 6
MOAS conflicts: 0
CAIDA AS-rank: 13,991
Customer-cone ASNs: 1
Facilities: 0
Internet exchanges: 0
Customer degree: 0
Peer degree: 0
Provider degree: 2

Route origin authorizations

A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 ROAs.

139.15.0.0/16 · max length /24
185.112.176.0/22 · max length /24
193.108.217.0/24 · max length /24
193.141.57.0/24 · max length /24
194.39.218.0/23 · max length /24
2a03:cc00::/32 · max length /32

Upstreams

The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS9183.

AS8220 · 3 shared paths
AS20514 · 1 shared path
AS327727 · 1 shared path
AS328840 · 1 shared path
AS1299 · 1 shared path

Blast radius

Announced IPv4 addresses: 67,584
Threat-listed addresses: 1
Threat density: 0.0015 %
Routed prefixes: 264

How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.

Peering ecosystem

A sample of 2 of this network’s 2 BGP neighbours.

DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS3320
COLT - COLT Technology Services Group Limited · AS8220

Reputation

20.5reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)

AS9183 (UNSPECIFIED - Robert Bosch Gesellschaft mit Beschraenkter Haftung, DE) has a reputation score of 49.5 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.

Threat density: 90.0/100
Graph metrics: 30.0/100
Historical behaviour: 30.0/100
Prefix age: 20.0/100

These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.

Registration

Registered to: Robert Bosch Gesellschaft mit Beschraenkter Haftung
RIR: RIPE
Registered: Mon, 19 Aug 2002 08:53:43 GMT
Abuse contact: BD_IP_Abuse@bosch.com

This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.

Threat-feed evidence

Pivot from AS9183 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.

Queries

This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
     collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
     collect(co.name) AS countries,
     collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
     collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
     collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
     collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
     collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
     collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
     collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
     collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
       a.rir AS rir,
       a.orgName AS orgName,
       a.asRank AS asRank,
       a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
       a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
       a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
       a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
       a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
       a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
       a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
       a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
       a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
       a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
       a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
       a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
       a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
       a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
       a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
       operatorNames, countries, organizations,
       samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
       signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
       prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCount

Run yourself →

The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observations