Autonomous System
AS9423
Last fetched
AS9423 is operated by SERVERKINGIOLLC-AS-AP - ServerKing.io, LLC, registered in US, and announces 9 prefixes to 6 BGP neighbours. AS9423 has a reputation score of 11.5 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 1,536 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 9
- BGP neighbours
- 6
- RPKI ROAs
- 9
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 30,489
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 23
- Internet exchanges
- 38
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 1
- Provider degree
- 4
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (38 total)
- Protocol 7 IX - Hong Kong
- FREMIX
- ixFabric - Lyon
- 4b42 Internet Exchange Point
- ixFabric - Zurich
- ixFabric - Frankfurt
- ixFabric - Rome
- ixFabric - Sydney
- ixFabric - Amsterdam
- ixFabric - London
- ixFabric - Fremont
- ixFabric - Auckland
- ixFabric - Moscow
- ixFabric - Hong Kong
- ixFabric - Singapore
- ixFabric - Los Angeles
- ixFabric - Adelaide
- ixFabric - Dusseldorf
- ixFabric - Johannesburg
- ixFabric - Kansas
- ixFabric - Barcelona
- KeFF-IX
- ixFabric - Bogata
- ixFabric - Miami
- ixFabric - Tokyo
Facilities (23 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Digital Realty Copenhagen CPH1-3
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Centersquare New Jersey (EWR5)
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Amsterdam (AMS-1)
- Gothnet DC Marieholm
- Malmö Västergatan 4 / Stortorget
- Hurricane Electric Fremont 2
- KoloDC NL1
- STOKAB KN7, Östermalm
- NorthC Amsterdam 1
- Green Datacenter ZRH1 (fka: Green Lupfig)
- Fiberhub LAS1
- Tech Futures YVR1
- Evocative DA4
- Templus DC Barcelona BCN01
- Obenet Kista Gate
- iTech Towers 2
- Qupra DC
- City Hosting
- Kern DC - Adelaide
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 9 of this network’s 9 ROAs.
- 103.31.116.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.31.117.0/24 · max length /24
- 2001:df1:7f40::/48 · max length /48
- 2001:df1:7f41::/48 · max length /48
- 2001:df1:7f42::/48 · max length /48
- 2001:df1:7f43::/48 · max length /48
- 140.235.249.0/24 · max length /24
- 204.126.106.0/23 · max length /23
- 23.147.184.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS9423.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,536
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 5
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 BGP neighbours.
- NOACKHOSTING-AS - No ACK Group Holding AB · AS30893
- DCS1PTELTD-AS-AP - DCS1 Pte. Ltd. · AS37989
- PONYNET - FranTech Solutions · AS53667
- SECUREBIT - Securebit AG · AS58057
- LOWHOSTING-AS - Lowhosting services of Davide Gennari · AS212508
- ROUTE64_ORG - Johannes Ernst · AS212895
Reputation
11.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS9423 (SERVERKINGIOLLC-AS-AP - ServerKing.io, LLC, US) has a reputation score of 67.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ServerKing.io, LLC
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Fri, 11 Nov 2022 02:34:30 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@serverking.io
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS9423 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.