Autonomous System
AS999
Last fetched
AS999 is operated by CORIX-999 - CORIX NETWORKS, registered in US, and announces 20 prefixes to 9 BGP neighbours. AS999 has a reputation score of 8.1 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 1,280 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 20
- BGP neighbours
- 9
- RPKI ROAs
- 15
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,379
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 12
- Facilities
- 28
- Internet exchanges
- 1
- Customer degree
- 9
- Peer degree
- 298
- Provider degree
- 4
- 23.145.72.0/24
- 208.89.72.0/24
- 208.89.73.0/24
- 208.89.74.0/24
- 208.89.75.0/24
- 2607:1640:50::/48
- 2607:1640:51::/48
- 2607:1640:52::/48
- 2607:1640:54::/48
- 2607:1640:55::/48
- 2607:1640:56::/48
- 2607:1640:57::/48
- 2607:1640:62::/48
- 2607:1640:72::/48
- 2607:1640:73::/48
- 2607:1640:75::/48
- 2607:1640:145::/48
- 2607:1640:999::/48
- 2607:1640:1036::/48
- 2607:1640::/32
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.04
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (1 total)
Facilities (28 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Digital Realty Madrid MAD1-2
- Equinix SP4 - São Paulo
- CoreSite - Washington,DC (DC1)
- CoreSite - Reston (VA1)
- Equinix LD5 - London, Slough
- Equinix SP2 - São Paulo
- Equinix BG1 - Bogota
- Equinix RJ2 - Rio de Janeiro
- CoreSite - Reston (VA2)
- Ascenty FTZ01 - Fortaleza
- CoreSite - Reston (VA3)
- Equinix LD7 - London, Slough
- Ascenty SPO02 - São Paulo
- Ascenty SPO03 - São Paulo
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 15 ROAs.
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS999.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,280
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 5
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 9 of this network’s 9 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- PEER1-1031 - PEER 1031 LLC · AS1031
- AS4230 - CLARO S.A. · AS4230
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- QWILTED-PROD-01 - Qwilt Inc. · AS20253
- AS22356 - Durand do Brasil Ltda · AS22356
- AS28663 - FLYS INTERATIVA LTDA · AS28663
- AS262505 - N4 Telecomunicacoes LTDA - ME · AS262505
Reputation
8.1reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS999 (CORIX-999 - CORIX NETWORKS, US) has a reputation score of 75.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- CORIX NETWORKS
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Tue, 11 Jun 2024 18:35:21 GMT
- Abuse contact
- corix@corix999.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS999 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.