Autonomous System
AS1237
Last fetched
AS1237 is operated by KREONET-AS-KR-KR - KISTI, registered in KR, and announces 213 prefixes to 42 BGP neighbours. AS1237 has a reputation score of 14.3 (NEUTRAL); 4 of its 299,776 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 213
- BGP neighbours
- 42
- RPKI ROAs
- 2,136
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,138
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 33
- Facilities
- 4
- Internet exchanges
- 1
- Customer degree
- 32
- Peer degree
- 11
- Provider degree
- 3
- 134.75.20.0/24
- 134.75.52.0/23
- 134.75.0.0/16
- 134.75.250.0/24
- 147.47.120.0/21
- 147.47.124.0/24
- 147.47.125.0/24
- 150.183.11.0/24
- 150.183.0.0/16
- 202.30.40.0/22
- 202.30.60.0/22
- 202.31.182.0/24
- 203.230.0.0/24
- 203.230.2.0/24
- 203.230.3.0/24
- 203.230.6.0/24
- 203.230.7.0/24
- 203.230.8.0/22
- 203.230.16.0/23
- 203.230.22.0/23
- 203.230.24.0/21
- 203.230.60.0/22
- 203.230.64.0/21
- 203.230.72.0/24
- 203.230.73.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (1 total)
Facilities (4 total)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 2,136 ROAs.
- 134.75.0.0/16 · max length /23
- 134.75.0.0/18 · max length /24
- 134.75.112.0/21 · max length /24
- 134.75.120.0/23 · max length /24
- 134.75.123.0/24 · max length /24
- 134.75.124.0/22 · max length /24
- 134.75.128.0/20 · max length /24
- 134.75.144.0/22 · max length /24
- 134.75.148.0/23 · max length /24
- 134.75.150.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS1237.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 299,776
- Threat-listed addresses
- 4
- Threat density
- 0.0013 %
- Routed prefixes
- 212
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 42 BGP neighbours.
- KAIST-SEOUL-AS-KR-KR - Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology · AS1704
- KAIST-DAEJEON-AS-KR-KR - Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology · AS1781
- KRIBB-AS-KR-KR - KRIBB(Korea Research Institute of Bioscience Biotechnology) · AS2385
- POSTECH-AS-KR-KR - Pohang University of Science and Technology · AS3784
- KIXS-AS-KR-KR - Korea Telecom · AS4766
- KAERINET-AS-KR - Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute · AS7564
- KASI-AS-KR-KR - Korea Astronomy Observatory · AS9275
- ITISNET-AS-KR - INHA UNIVERSITY · AS9317
- SNU-AS-KR-KR - Seoul National University · AS9488
- KARINET-AS-KR - Korea Aerospace Research Institute · AS9489
- KIMM-AS-KR-KR - KOREA INSTITUTE OF MACHINERY MATERIALS (KIMM) · AS9568
- KBSI-AS-KR-KR - Korea Basic Science Institute · AS9637
- SKKUNET-AS-KR - SungKyunKwan University (SKKU) · AS9686
- KOEXP-AS-KR-KR - KISTI · AS9695
- HOSEO-AS-KR - Hoseo University · AS9949
- KNU-AS-KR - Kyungpook National University · AS10052
- KMA-AS-KR - Korea Meteorological Administration · AS10063
- KRISS-AS-KR - KRISS SubDAEJONnetworks connected to backbone · AS10070
- SNUH-AS-KR-KR - SNUH · AS10162
- KISDI-AS-KR-KR - Korea Information Society Developement Institute · AS10187
- KREONET2-AS-KR-KR - KISTI · AS17579
- KINSNET-AS-KR-KR - Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety · AS17595
- KONYANG-AS-KR-KR - Konyang University · AS17856
- KISTNET-AS-KR-KR - Korea Institute of Science and Technology · AS17866
- CHEJU-AS-KR-KR - JEJU NATIONAL UNIVERSITY · AS18026
Reputation
14.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS1237 (KREONET-AS-KR-KR - KISTI, KR) has a reputation score of 61.4 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 49.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- KISTI
- RIR
- APNIC
- Abuse contact
- irt@nic.or.kr
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS1237 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.