Autonomous System
AS15372
Last fetched
AS15372 is operated by IBH-AS - IBH connect GmbH, registered in DE, and announces 12 prefixes to 12 BGP neighbours. AS15372 has a reputation score of 8.9 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 11,520 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 12
- BGP neighbours
- 12
- RPKI ROAs
- 11
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 4,524
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 5
- Facilities
- 18
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 5
- Provider degree
- 6
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (18 total)
- Speedbone Berlin
- NorthC Berlin
- CarrierColo Berlin Luetzow (I/P/B/ site B)
- DNS:NET Colo I Berlin
- euNetworks Colocation Berlin
- NTT Berlin 1 Data Center (BER1)
- euNetworks Colocation Dresden
- CarrierColo Berlin Kitzing (I/P/B/ site K)
- 3U Rechenzentrum Berlin
- AtlasEdge DC Berlin BER001
- Datacenter Berlin Mahlsdorf (RZB) - PŸUR Business
- NTT Berlin 2 Data Center (BER2)
- Penta Infra Berlin BER01
- IBH Dresden C2
- IBH Dresden C1
- Kraftwerk Mitte Dresden
- SachsenEnergieCenter Dresden
- DataCenter Dresden Reick
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 11 ROAs.
- 141.76.202.0/24 · max length /24
- 153.96.101.0/24 · max length /24
- 153.96.230.0/24 · max length /24
- 176.111.245.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.176.146.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.36.120.0/22 · max length /22
- 195.248.83.0/24 · max length /24
- 2001:67c:12b8::/48 · max length /48
- 212.111.224.0/19 · max length /24
- 2a01:7700::/32 · max length /32
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS15372.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 11,520
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 10
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 12 of this network’s 12 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS3320
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- NEO-ASN - Zayo Infrastructure France SA · AS8218
- WOBCOM - Wobcom GmbH · AS9136
- PHOTRONICS - Photronics Inc. · AS11528
- LAMBDANET-AS - euNetworks GmbH · AS13237
- ENVIA-TEL-AS - Envia Tel GmbH · AS21413
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- cnh-primary - CLOUD & HEAT Technologies GmbH · AS203592
- LHDD-AS - Landeshauptstadt Dresden, EB IT Dienstleistungen Dresden · AS208508
- DDIT-AS - Dresden-IT GmbH · AS215556
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS15372 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
8.9reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS15372 (IBH-AS - IBH connect GmbH, DE) has a reputation score of 73.2 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 75.7/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- IBH connect GmbH
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 10 Jan 2002 15:05:43 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@ibh.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS15372 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.