Autonomous System
AS72
Last fetched
AS72 is operated by SCHLUMBERGER-AS - Schlumberger Limited, registered in US, and announces 138 prefixes to 33 BGP neighbours. AS72 has a reputation score of 9.3 (REPUTABLE); 4 of its 1,155,584 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 138
- BGP neighbours
- 33
- RPKI ROAs
- 5
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 12,946
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 96
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 4
- Provider degree
- 36
- 128.58.0.0/16
- 129.87.0.0/16
- 134.32.0.0/16
- 136.249.32.0/19
- 136.249.64.0/18
- 136.249.0.0/16
- 136.250.0.0/16
- 136.251.0.0/16
- 136.252.0.0/16
- 136.252.128.0/17
- 136.252.251.0/24
- 136.252.252.0/24
- 136.252.253.0/24
- 136.252.254.0/24
- 136.253.0.0/16
- 136.253.192.0/18
- 136.254.0.0/16
- 137.144.0.0/16
- 163.183.0.0/16
- 163.184.0.0/16
- 163.185.0.0/16
- 163.186.0.0/16
- 163.187.0.0/16
- 163.188.0.0/16
- 192.12.34.0/23
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (2 total)
Facilities (96 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Dusseldorf DUS1-3
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- EdgeConneX Munich (EDCMUC01)
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
- Digital Realty Copenhagen CPH1-3
- NorthC Duesseldorf
- Speedbone Berlin
- GlobalConnect Taastrup 1 (CPH1)
- Digital Realty Dublin DUB1-2
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 5 of this network’s 5 ROAs.
- 192.23.18.0/24 · max length /24
- 192.23.183.0/24 · max length /24
- 192.23.31.0/24 · max length /24
- 192.58.38.0/23 · max length /23
- 212.193.96.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS72.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,155,584
- Threat-listed addresses
- 4
- Threat density
- 0.0003 %
- Routed prefixes
- 138
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 33 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- CW - IDDQD-AS · AS1273
- ATGS-MMD-AS - AT&T Enterprises, LLC · AS2686
- ATGS-MMD-AS - AT&T Enterprises, LLC · AS2688
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- BT - British Telecommunications Limited · AS3300
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- BT - British Telecommunications Limited · AS5400
- CWASIA - Vodafone Enterprise Equipment Limited · AS6660
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- COLT - COLT Technology Services Group Limited · AS8220
- MTS - MTS PJSC · AS8359
- TE-AS - IDDQD-AS · AS8452
- ERTH-TRANSIT-AS - JSC "ER-Telecom Holding" · AS9049
- TTNET-MY - TIME dotCom Berhad No. 14, Jalan Majistret U1/26 Hicom Glenmarie Industrial Park 40150 Shah Alam Selangor, Malaysia · AS9930
- NTPCL-AS-AP - National Telecom Public Company Limited · AS9931
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- DU-AS1 - Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC · AS15802
- AS16735 - ALGAR TELECOM S/A · AS16735
- RELIANCE-COMMUNICATIONS-IN - Reliance Communications Ltd.DAKC MUMBAI · AS18101
- OPEN-PEERING-AS - Broadband Hosting B.V. · AS20562
- JOINTTRANSIT-AS - Broadband Hosting B.V. · AS24785
- SAUDINETSTC-AS - Saudi Telecom Company JSC · AS25019
- Altibox_AS - Lyse Tele AS · AS29695
- KTC-AS - QMOBILE JSC · AS35104
Reputation
9.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS72 (SCHLUMBERGER-AS - Schlumberger Limited, US) has a reputation score of 72.0 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Schlumberger Limited
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Mon, 05 May 1986 04:00:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@slb.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS72 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.