Autonomous System
AS18978
Last fetched
AS18978 is operated by ENZUINC-US - Enzu Inc, registered in US, and announces 118 prefixes to 10 BGP neighbours. AS18978 has a reputation score of 15.7 (NEUTRAL); 45 of its 156,160 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 118
- BGP neighbours
- 10
- RPKI ROAs
- 42
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 5,008
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 4
- Facilities
- 107
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- Customer degree
- 3
- Peer degree
- 53
- Provider degree
- 6
- 5.180.25.0/24
- 5.180.26.0/24
- 5.180.28.0/24
- 5.180.41.0/24
- 5.180.44.0/24
- 5.180.53.0/24
- 5.180.144.0/24
- 5.180.146.0/24
- 23.231.192.0/18
- 38.34.160.0/22
- 38.34.164.0/24
- 38.34.164.0/23
- 38.34.166.0/24
- 38.34.172.0/22
- 38.34.176.0/24
- 38.34.176.0/21
- 38.34.184.0/23
- 38.34.186.0/23
- 38.34.188.0/23
- 38.34.190.0/23
- 38.127.44.0/23
- 38.127.32.0/19
- 38.127.50.0/23
- 38.127.56.0/23
- 38.127.60.0/23
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (7 total)
Facilities (107 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Equinix DA3 - Dallas
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Equinix BA1 - Barcelona
- Equinix MD2 - Madrid
- Telehouse – TOKYO Otemachi (KDDI Otemachi)
- Equinix SY1/SY2 - Sydney
- iM Critical Miami
- Equinix HK1 - Hong Kong
- Equinix TY1 - Tokyo
- Equinix SG1 - Singapore
- 365 Data Centers Chicago (CH6)
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA2)
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- CoreSite - Denver (DE1)
- Digital Realty LAX (600 W 7th)
- CoreSite - Chicago (CH1)
- Equinix TY2 - Tokyo
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 42 ROAs.
- 104.218.192.0/24 · max length /24
- 107.163.160.0/19 · max length /24
- 157.254.160.0/23 · max length /23
- 76.9.97.0/24 · max length /24
- 142.228.234.0/24 · max length /24
- 147.90.120.0/23 · max length /24
- 151.244.133.0/24 · max length /24
- 162.141.55.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.124.244.0/23 · max length /24
- 194.59.220.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS18978.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 156,160
- Threat-listed addresses
- 45
- Threat density
- 0.0288 %
- Routed prefixes
- 99
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- ZAYO-6461 - Zayo Bandwidth · AS6461
- SEABONE-NET - TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. · AS6762
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- AARNET-AS-AP - Australian Academic and Research Network (AARNet) · AS7575
- DN-154-26739 - Dash Networks Inc. · AS26739
- SAEOL-1-ASN - 1st Amendment Encrypted Openness LLC · AS36849
- GSLNETWORKS-AS-AP - GSL Networks Pty LTD · AS137409
Reputation
15.7reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS18978 (ENZUINC-US - Enzu Inc, US) has a reputation score of 58.6 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 41.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Enzu Inc
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Tue, 04 Jan 2011 19:29:34 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@scalabledns.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS18978 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.