Autonomous System
AS200019
Last fetched
AS200019 is operated by AlexHost - ALEXHOST SRL, registered in MD, and announces 150 prefixes to 22 BGP neighbours. AS200019 has a reputation score of 16.1 (NEUTRAL); 398 of its 46,080 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 150
- BGP neighbours
- 22
- RPKI ROAs
- 163
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,831
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 6
- Facilities
- 22
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 5
- Peer degree
- 9
- Provider degree
- 16
- 2.59.219.0/24
- 5.63.19.0/24
- 5.181.0.0/24
- 5.252.20.0/24
- 37.221.65.0/24
- 37.221.67.0/24
- 45.86.86.0/24
- 45.93.8.0/24
- 45.145.0.0/24
- 45.148.244.0/24
- 45.150.110.0/24
- 46.16.34.0/24
- 80.96.58.0/24
- 80.96.59.0/24
- 80.96.68.0/24
- 80.96.108.0/24
- 80.96.112.0/24
- 80.96.113.0/24
- 80.97.124.0/24
- 80.97.128.0/20
- 81.180.92.0/24
- 81.180.93.0/24
- 85.120.52.0/24
- 85.120.53.0/24
- 85.120.81.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (22 total)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- TELEPOINT Sofia Centre
- iNES Datacenter Bucharest
- NXDATA-2 Bucharest (BUH2)
- NTT Zurich 1 Data Center (ZRH1)
- Trabia
- Voxility IR1 Bucharest
- M247 Europe Bucharest
- Teletrans Datacenter
- GTS Telecom DC Bucharest
- DROBETA DATACENTER
- S3 Company Ltd.
- Starnet Media Cluj-Napoca
- efectRO DC1
- Radiocom
- AlexHost, Republic of Moldova
- AlexHost, Netherlands
- Data City - Moldtelecom
- COLO-54 Moldtelecom
- Timisoara 1
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 163 ROAs.
- 2001:470:5b0::/48 · max length /48
- 108.165.196.0/23
- 108.165.228.0/22
- 131.123.32.0/19 · max length /24
- 131.123.32.0/24 · max length /24
- 131.123.33.0/24 · max length /24
- 131.123.34.0/24 · max length /24
- 131.123.35.0/24 · max length /24
- 131.123.36.0/24 · max length /24
- 131.123.37.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS200019.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 46,080
- Threat-listed addresses
- 398
- Threat density
- 0.8637 %
- Routed prefixes
- 138
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 22 of this network’s 22 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- S3Company - S3 Company Ltd · AS4849
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- ZET-NET - INTERKVM HOST SRL · AS6204
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- MOLDTELECOM-AS - Moldtelecom SA · AS8926
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
- belcloud - Belcloud LTD · AS44901
- AVAHOHST - AVA HOST SRL · AS48753
- FBWNETWORKS - FBW NETWORKS SAS · AS49434
- FIBERHUB - VegasNAP, LLC · AS53340
- CMI-INT-HK - China Mobile International Limited · AS58453
- Balkan-Internet-Exchange - Balkan Internet Exchange Ltd · AS59900
- CDN77 - Datacamp Limited · AS60068
- INFOTECH-GRUP - S.C. INFOTECH-GRUP S.R.L. · AS201670
- ZIN-AS - Zimnitskaya Irina Nikolaevna · AS204909
- VAA-AS - Vyshegorodtseva Alla Alekseevna · AS205828
- Inleed - Yelles AB · AS206170
- ALEXHOST_SRL - ALEXHOST S.R.L. · AS207636
- BEA-AS - Bezhin Evgenii Alekseevich · AS215290
Reputation
16.1reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS200019 (AlexHost - ALEXHOST SRL, MD) has a reputation score of 57.8 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 31.7/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ALEXHOST SRL
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 30 Oct 2013 08:47:08 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@alexhost.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS200019 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.