Autonomous System
AS201776
Last fetched
AS201776 is operated by MIRANDA-AS - Miranda-Media Ltd, registered in RU, and announces 119 prefixes to 89 BGP neighbours. AS201776 has a reputation score of 14.6 (NEUTRAL); 28 of its 69,888 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 119
- BGP neighbours
- 89
- RPKI ROAs
- 112
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 394
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 133
- Facilities
- 62
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 72
- Peer degree
- 29
- Provider degree
- 3
- 2.59.51.0/24
- 2.63.144.0/20
- 2.63.176.0/24
- 2.63.180.0/22
- 2.63.176.0/20
- 2.63.184.0/24
- 2.63.225.0/24
- 2.63.231.0/24
- 2.63.224.0/20
- 2.63.232.0/24
- 31.40.130.0/24
- 31.40.132.0/24
- 31.40.137.0/24
- 31.40.138.0/24
- 31.40.140.0/24
- 31.40.143.0/24
- 31.40.151.0/24
- 31.40.153.0/24
- 31.40.162.0/23
- 31.40.165.0/24
- 31.40.167.0/24
- 31.40.168.0/24
- 31.40.168.0/23
- 31.40.169.0/24
- 31.40.170.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.52
- Origin mismatches
- 15
- Route leaks
- 3
Leak types observed: TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (62 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- Moscow M9
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Dataplex Budapest
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NewTelco Kiev
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- LIM Warsaw
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Moscow M10
- Ucomline Kiev
- Sitel Bratislava
- Equinix SK2 - Stockholm, Sköndal
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 112 ROAs.
- 109.236.52.0/22 · max length /22
- 109.237.104.0/24 · max length /24
- 109.94.220.0/22 · max length /22
- 176.119.169.0/24 · max length /24
- 176.119.170.0/24 · max length /24
- 176.119.171.0/24 · max length /24
- 176.119.172.0/24 · max length /24
- 176.208.74.0/24 · max length /24
- 176.211.120.0/22 · max length /22
- 178.173.124.0/22 · max length /22
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS201776.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 69,888
- Threat-listed addresses
- 28
- Threat density
- 0.0401 %
- Routed prefixes
- 118
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 89 BGP neighbours.
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- CRELCOM-NET - CRELCOM LLC · AS6789
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- NEO-ASN - Zayo Infrastructure France SA · AS8218
- BAYDAR-AS - PE Pusko Iliya Viktorovich · AS8381
- A1TELEKOM-AT - A1 Telekom Austria AG · AS8447
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- FEONET-AS - Telecommunication company FEONET+ LLC · AS12403
- MM-AS - Meshnet ltd. · AS12773
- DEC-AS - Donbass Electronic Communications Ltd. · AS20590
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- MIRANDA-IX - Miranda-Media Ltd · AS21445
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IP-Max - IP-Max SA · AS25091
- BCLAN-AS - BCLan LLC · AS25591
- CrimeaCom-LLC - CrimeaCom South LLC · AS28761
- LTC - Lugansk Telephone Company LLC · AS29031
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- JUPITER-AS - TOV Point · AS31531
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
- INKO-NET-AS - Atsuta Pavel Georgievich · AS34180
- SEVSTAR - Lancom Ltd. · AS35816
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- MTRX-ALCHEVSK-AS - Osipenko Alexander Nikolaevich · AS39529
- DON-FTTH - Timer, LLC · AS41039
Reputation
14.6reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS201776 (MIRANDA-AS - Miranda-Media Ltd, RU) has a reputation score of 60.8 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 47.4/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Miranda-Media Ltd
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 16 Jul 2014 12:36:48 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@miranda-media.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS201776 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.