Autonomous System
AS21320
Last fetched
AS21320 is operated by GEANT_IAS_VRF - GEANT Vereniging, registered in NL, and announces 1 prefix to 52 BGP neighbours. AS21320 has a reputation score of 9.7 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 2,048 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 1
- BGP neighbours
- 52
- RPKI ROAs
- 1
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 166
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 328
- Facilities
- 138
- Internet exchanges
- 17
- Customer degree
- 34
- Peer degree
- 116
- Provider degree
- 2
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.12
- Route leaks
- 7
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (17 total)
Facilities (138 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Vienna University Computer Center (Wien)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty Paris PAR1
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- Digital Realty Madrid MAD1-2
- Level(3) Brussels
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 1 of this network’s 1 ROAs.
- 83.97.88.0/21 · max length /21
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS21320.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,048
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 1
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 52 BGP neighbours.
- ASGARR - Consortium GARR · AS137
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- MACHBA-AS - IUCC - Israel InterUniversity Computation Center · AS378
- CERN - CERN - European Organization for Nuclear Research · AS513
- RedIRIS - Entidad Publica Empresarial Red.es · AS766
- Asiera - ASIERA TECHNOLOGY SERVICES CLG · AS1213
- ACOnet - ACONET · AS1853
- RCCN - Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia, I.P. · AS1930
- HBONE-AS - KIFU (Governmental Info Tech Development Agency) · AS1955
- ARNES-NET - ARNES · AS2107
- CARNet-AS - Croatian Academic and Research Network · AS2108
- FR-RENATER - Renater · AS2200
- RESTENA - Fondation RESTENA · AS2602
- NORDUNET - NORDUnet · AS2603
- SANET - Zdruzenie pouzivatelov Slovenskej akademickej datovej siete SANET · AS2607
- BELNET - BELNET · AS2611
- RoEduNet - Agentia de Administrare a Retelei Nationale de Informatica pentru Educatie si Cercetare · AS2614
- LITNET - Kauno Technologijos Universitetas · AS2847
- CESNET2 - CESNET z.s.p.o. · AS2852
- Algerian Academic Research Network - Algerian Academic Research Network · AS3208
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- EENet-AS - Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium · AS3221
- UNSPECIFIED - University of Cyprus · AS3268
- SWISSCOM - Swisscom (Schweiz) AG · AS3303
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
Reputation
9.7reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS21320 (GEANT_IAS_VRF - GEANT Vereniging, NL) has a reputation score of 70.9 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 76.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- GEANT Vereniging
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 31 Oct 2001 13:07:25 GMT
- Abuse contact
- cert@geant.org
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS21320 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.