Autonomous System
AS213753
Last fetched
AS213753 is operated by interedge - InterEdge B.V., registered in NL, and announces 3 prefixes to 31 BGP neighbours. AS213753 has a reputation score of 50.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS); 1 of its 512 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 3
- BGP neighbours
- 31
- RPKI ROAs
- 4
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,081
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 36
- Facilities
- 69
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 13
- Peer degree
- 38
- Provider degree
- 4
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.05
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Signals
- bulletproof-hostingHosts content other providers routinely take down.
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (69 total)
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- UltraEdge Lyon-Venissieux
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Equinix PA5 - Paris, Victor Hugo
- Equinix ZH2 - Zurich
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix PA2 - Paris, Saint-Denis
- NTT Frankfurt 1 Data Center (FRA1)
- UltraEdge Bordeaux
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- CERN Geneva
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Equinix PA3 - Paris, Saint-Denis
- Equinix FR4 - Frankfurt, West
- Telehouse - Paris 3 (Magny)
- OPCORE - DC2 / PAR2
- nLighten Amsterdam AMS1
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 4 of this network’s 4 ROAs.
- 2001:470:3cd::/48 · max length /48
- 209.182.102.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.28.38.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a00:9c20::/32 · max length /32
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS213753.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 512
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1
- Threat density
- 0.1953 %
- Routed prefixes
- 2
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 31 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- XTOM - xTom GmbH · AS3214
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- HOP179 - Hop179 OU · AS11967
- NL-BIT - BIT BV · AS12859
- GITOYEN-MAIN-AS - Association "Gitoyen" · AS20766
- PLEX - Plex BV · AS21478
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IP-Max - IP-Max SA · AS25091
- AS26954 - Mikhail Fedorov · AS26954
- IELO - IELO-LIAZO SERVICES SAS · AS29075
- iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
- VIRTUASYS-EU - VIRTUA SYSTEMS SAS · AS35661
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- COREROUTE-AS - CoreRoute UG · AS49585
- DIEDERIK-AS - Diederik Focko de Zee · AS50917
- ColoCenter - ColoCenter b.v. · AS58291
- GRIFON - Association GRIFON · AS204092
- LSG - Lungu Stefan Gabriel · AS205941
- RDKIT - RDK IT Solutions B.V. · AS207489
- BAREMETAL-AE - Falcon FZE LLC · AS208111
- AxisNetworks - Jelle Hofstee trading as AxisNetworks · AS209675
- OXAR - NAML B.V. · AS211623
Reputation
50.0reputation score (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS)
AS213753 (interedge - InterEdge B.V., NL) has a reputation score of 25.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 52.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- InterEdge B.V.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 05 Dec 2024 11:01:08 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@inter-ix.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS213753 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.