Autonomous System
AS216078
Last fetched
AS216078 is operated by KREMER-AS - Liam Kremer, registered in DE, and announces 18 prefixes to 23 BGP neighbours. AS216078 has a reputation score of 50.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS); 9 of its 1,280 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 18
- BGP neighbours
- 23
- RPKI ROAs
- 19
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 4,785
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 5
- Facilities
- 38
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 22
- Provider degree
- 2
Signals
- bulletproof-hostingHosts content other providers routinely take down.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (2 total)
Facilities (38 total)
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- BIT-1
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- InterDC Doetinchem
- Databarn Amsterdam
- BIT-2
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Amsterdam (AMS-1)
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Digital Realty AMS18 - Amsterdam
- NorthC Amsterdam 1
- InterDC Enschede
- Previder PDC2
- Equinix AM11 - Amsterdam, Lemelerbergweg
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- ColoCenter Zoetermeer
- DFDC The Hague
- Interconnect Services DC2 Eindhoven
- Eurofiber Datacenter Rotterdam 2
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 19 ROAs.
- 146.255.189.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.178.226.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.200.78.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.46.33.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a0f:9b40::/29 · max length /29
- 2a13:bb40::/29 · max length /29
- 2a14:1100::/29 · max length /29
- 2a14:6a40::/29 · max length /29
- 2a14:c380:3000::/40 · max length /40
- 2a14:c380:31::/48 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS216078.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,280
- Threat-listed addresses
- 9
- Threat density
- 0.7031 %
- Routed prefixes
- 5
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 23 of this network’s 23 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- Servperso_Systems - Sarah Rossius trading as Servperso Systems · AS34872
- DIEDERIK-AS - Diederik Focko de Zee · AS50917
- GSLNETWORKS-AS-AP - GSL Networks Pty LTD · AS137409
- SORAYOU-AS-JP - Sora You · AS151331
- A-NET - BangLong Yang · AS199436
- KRAUSE-AS - Joel Krause · AS200912
- CREEKY-NOISES-MAKE-MY-SKIN-CREEP-I-NEED-TO-GET-SOME-SLEEP-I-CAN-T-GET-NO-SLEEP - BEANSUMMERHOST NEXTGEN SHED HOSTING SOLUTIONS LLC · AS206540
- AMIRGT-AS - Youssef Hamed · AS207740
- Aluy - Julian Achter · AS211507
- FLARESU-ORG-AS - Ramil Rinatovich Kurmaev · AS213501
- FALCON - Falcon FZE LLC · AS213622
- interedge - InterEdge B.V. · AS213753
- VEXURA - Vexura UG (Haftungsbeschraenkt) · AS214556
- LIME-HOST - LIMEE NETWORK LTD · AS215023
- YUWAN-NETWORKS - YUWAN NETWORKS LIMITED · AS215415
- NETCENSUS-AS - NETCENSUS LTD · AS218713
- SnowcoreInc - Snowcore Inc · AS218986
- INTELLIGENCE - Intelligence Hosting LLC · AS400328
- BIXCE - BIXCE Inc · AS401753
- AS-CUSTOMER - IDC Cube · AS401776
- VOSMET - Vosmet · AS402933
Reputation
50.0reputation score (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS)
AS216078 (KREMER-AS - Liam Kremer, DE) has a reputation score of 25.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 20.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Liam Kremer
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 30 Oct 2023 07:48:58 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@trivox.sh
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS216078 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.