Autonomous System
AS216096
Last fetched
AS216096 is operated by SECUREPEAK - Alex Terrats Ciberseguretat SLU, registered in AD, and announces 9 prefixes to 4 BGP neighbours. AS216096 has a reputation score of 10.2 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 1,024 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 9
- BGP neighbours
- 4
- RPKI ROAs
- 36
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 45,130
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 240
- Internet exchanges
- 26
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 48
- Provider degree
- 13
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (26 total)
- Speed-IX
- LINX LON1
- LOCIX DUSSELDORF
- GNM-IX
- NL-ix
- ONIX
- FREMIX
- KCIX
- IX Australia Adelaide (SA-IX)
- TurkIX Sofia
- IX Australia Sydney (NSW-IX)
- LOCIX FRANKFURT
- LINX LON2
- FogIXP
- ERA-IX Amsterdam
- ixFabric - Zurich
- KleyReX
- ixFabric - Frankfurt
- ixFabric - Amsterdam
- ixFabric - London
- ixFabric - Dusseldorf
- IX Australia Brisbane (QLD-IX)
- nine
- LOCIX NETHERLANDS
- NVIX
Facilities (240 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix SY1/SY2 - Sydney
- Digital Realty Copenhagen CPH1-3
- GlobalConnect Taastrup 1 (CPH1)
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- Moscow M9
- NorthC Duesseldorf
- BIT-1
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- EdgeConneX Munich (EDCMUC01)
- Digital Realty Dusseldorf DUS1-3
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Equinix PA5 - Paris, Victor Hugo
- Equinix ZH2 - Zurich
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 36 ROAs.
- 109.175.210.0/24 · max length /24
- 109.205.193.0/24 · max length /24
- 158.94.220.0/23 · max length /24
- 158.94.220.0/24 · max length /24
- 158.94.221.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a01:fb00::/32 · max length /34
- 2a01:fb00::/33 · max length /34
- 2a01:fb00::/34 · max length /34
- 2a01:fb01::/32 · max length /32
- 2a01:fb02:4000::/34 · max length /34
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS216096.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,024
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 4
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 4 of this network’s 4 BGP neighbours.
- GITOYEN-MAIN-AS - Association "Gitoyen" · AS20766
- Servperso_Systems - Sarah Rossius trading as Servperso Systems · AS34872
- iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
- SECUREBIT - Securebit AG · AS58057
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS216096 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
10.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS216096 (SECUREPEAK - Alex Terrats Ciberseguretat SLU, AD) has a reputation score of 69.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Alex Terrats Ciberseguretat SLU
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 08 Jul 2025 09:21:18 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@securepeak.ad
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS216096 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.