Autonomous System
AS21804
Last fetched
AS21804 is operated by ACCESS-SK - Access Communications Co-operative Limited, registered in CA, and announces 27 prefixes to 7 BGP neighbours. AS21804 has a reputation score of 12.4 (NEUTRAL); 9 of its 90,624 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 27
- BGP neighbours
- 7
- RPKI ROAs
- 63
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 5,070
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 4
- Facilities
- 27
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 3
- Peer degree
- 22
- Provider degree
- 2
- 23.146.176.0/24
- 23.182.112.0/24
- 24.72.0.0/19
- 24.72.32.0/19
- 24.72.64.0/19
- 24.72.96.0/19
- 24.72.128.0/20
- 24.89.64.0/18
- 65.87.224.0/19
- 74.206.128.0/22
- 74.206.132.0/23
- 74.206.135.0/24
- 74.206.128.0/19
- 74.206.147.0/24
- 74.206.144.0/20
- 96.63.128.0/20
- 96.63.144.0/20
- 96.63.160.0/21
- 96.63.168.0/22
- 96.63.172.0/23
- 96.63.174.0/24
- 96.63.175.0/24
- 184.169.48.0/20
- 209.34.96.0/20
- 2605:7200::/33
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (27 total)
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Neutral Data Toronto
- Telehouse Toronto (151 Front St West)
- KOMO Plaza Seattle (Formerly Fisher Plaza)
- Digital Realty CHI (350 E Cermak)
- Intergate West / Digital.forest / Fortress
- Cologix TOR1
- Cologix MIN1
- Equinix CH3 - Elk Grove
- Equinix TR2 - Toronto
- Telehouse Toronto (250 Front St West)
- Cologix MIN2
- Cologix TOR2
- Centersquare Seattle (SEA1-B)
- H5 Data Centers Seattle
- Cologix MIN3
- Cologix MIN4
- Sabey Intergate East Building 4
- WowRack
- Telehouse Toronto (905 King Street West)
- Coloware YTZ1
- 1530 SWIFT - NOCIX
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 63 ROAs.
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS21804.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 90,624
- Threat-listed addresses
- 9
- Threat density
- 0.0099 %
- Routed prefixes
- 24
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 7 of this network’s 7 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- SHAW - Shaw Communications · AS6327
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- AARNET-AS-AP - Australian Academic and Research Network (AARNet) · AS7575
- ACCESS-COMMUNICATIONS-CO-OPERATIVE - EVSL · AS53543
- REAL-ASN-01 - Regina Exhibition Association Ltd · AS397894
Reputation
12.4reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS21804 (ACCESS-SK - Access Communications Co-operative Limited, CA) has a reputation score of 65.2 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 70.6/100
- Graph metrics
- 65.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Access Communications Co-operative Limited
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Thu, 21 Jun 2001 04:00:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@accesscomm.ca
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS21804 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.