Autonomous System
AS25233
Last fetched
AS25233 is operated by AWALNET-ASN - ARABIAN INTERNET & COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES CO.LTD, registered in SA, and announces 54 prefixes to 12 BGP neighbours. AS25233 has a reputation score of 11.2 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 165,120 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 54
- BGP neighbours
- 12
- RPKI ROAs
- 54
- MOAS conflicts
- 2
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,520
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 11
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 10
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 3
- 77.64.40.0/24
- 77.64.0.0/17
- 78.93.28.0/24
- 78.93.45.0/24
- 78.93.72.0/22
- 78.93.92.0/22
- 78.93.96.0/22
- 78.93.107.0/24
- 78.93.108.0/24
- 78.93.109.0/24
- 78.93.0.0/16
- 78.93.144.0/24
- 78.93.145.0/24
- 78.93.146.0/24
- 78.93.147.0/24
- 78.93.148.0/24
- 78.93.149.0/24
- 78.93.150.0/24
- 78.93.151.0/24
- 78.93.152.0/24
- 78.93.153.0/24
- 78.93.154.0/24
- 78.93.155.0/24
- 78.93.156.0/24
- 78.93.157.0/24
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 54 ROAs.
- 185.3.122.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.100.192.0/19 · max length /19
- 212.100.210.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.100.218.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.100.223.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.116.192.0/19 · max length /19
- 212.93.192.0/19 · max length /19
- 212.93.196.0/24 · max length /24
- 213.184.160.0/19 · max length /19
- 2a02:df0::/32 · max length /32
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS25233.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 165,120
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 52
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 12 of this network’s 12 BGP neighbours.
- STC-IGW-AS - Saudi Telecom Company JSC · AS39386
- SFB-AS - Banque Saudi Fransi · AS41594
- ARABSAT - Arab Satellite Communications Organization · AS41659
- SEC_AS - Saudi Energy Company · AS44577
- ATHEEB-AS - Etihad GO Company For communications · AS48695
- SAUAS - Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University · AS60161
- NIC-SAIX-P-Cloud - NIC (National Information Center)- SDAIA ( Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority ) · AS198795
- MAADEN - Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden) JSC · AS200025
- ODC-COL - ARABIAN INTERNET & COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES CO.LTD · AS201769
- NIC-SDAIA-Deem - NIC (National Information Center)- SDAIA ( Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority ) · AS209342
- ICAP - Alistithmar for Financial Securities and Brokerage Company JSC · AS211266
- KIRKLAND-ELLIS-RY - Kirkland & Ellis LLP · AS399368
MOAS / hijack watch
2 announced prefixes conflict with AS25233 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
11.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS25233 (AWALNET-ASN - ARABIAN INTERNET & COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES CO.LTD, SA) has a reputation score of 67.7 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 74.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ARABIAN INTERNET & COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES CO.LTD
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 09 Sep 2002 10:02:21 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@solutions.com.sa
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS25233 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.