Autonomous System
AS39386
Last fetched
AS39386 is operated by STC-IGW-AS - Saudi Telecom Company JSC, registered in SA, and announces 16 prefixes to 119 BGP neighbours. AS39386 has a reputation score of 9.3 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 34,048 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 16
- BGP neighbours
- 119
- RPKI ROAs
- 15
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 304
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 169
- Facilities
- 205
- Internet exchanges
- 18
- Customer degree
- 57
- Peer degree
- 165
- Provider degree
- 9
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.19
- Route leaks
- 20
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (18 total)
Facilities (205 total)
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty Paris PAR2
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Equinix PA7 - Paris, Energy Park
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 15 ROAs.
- 159.0.184.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.86.50.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.19.244.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.118.154.0/24 · max length /24
- 37.224.192.0/24 · max length /24
- 84.235.0.0/17 · max length /17
- 84.235.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 84.235.108.0/24 · max length /24
- 84.235.109.0/24 · max length /24
- 84.235.110.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS39386.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 34,048
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 15
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 119 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- ONEWEB - OneWeb · AS800
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- KPN - KPN B.V. · AS1136
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- NEXTLAYER-AS - Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH · AS1764
- GREEN - green.ch AG · AS1836
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- RIPE-NCC-AS - Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) · AS3333
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- STARHUB-INTERNET - StarHub Ltd · AS4657
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- UNSPECIFIED - BEYON B.S.C. · AS5416
- Opentransit - Orange S.A. · AS5511
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- VERIXI - VERIXI SA · AS6696
- SEABONE-NET - TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. · AS6762
- AMS-IX-RS - Amsterdam Internet Exchange B.V. · AS6777
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- A1TELEKOM-AT - A1 Telekom Austria AG · AS8447
- ISU - King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology · AS8895
- Etisalat-AS - EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSC · AS8966
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
Reputation
9.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS39386 (STC-IGW-AS - Saudi Telecom Company JSC, SA) has a reputation score of 72.0 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Saudi Telecom Company JSC
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 13 Feb 2006 14:05:22 GMT
- Abuse contact
- registry@stc.com.sa
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS39386 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.