Autonomous System
AS26141
Last fetched
AS26141 is operated by CUBEPATH - CubePath, registered in US, and announces 14 prefixes to 10 BGP neighbours. AS26141 has a reputation score of 15.3 (NEUTRAL); 1 of its 2,304 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 14
- BGP neighbours
- 10
- RPKI ROAs
- 14
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 4,449
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 5
- Facilities
- 74
- Internet exchanges
- 9
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 58
- Provider degree
- 6
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (9 total)
Facilities (74 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix BA1 - Barcelona
- Digital Realty Madrid MAD1-2
- Equinix MD2 - Madrid
- iM Critical Miami
- Moscow M9
- CoreSite - Washington,DC (DC1)
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- NewTelco Kiev
- Equinix MI2 - Miami
- 365 Data Centers Boca Raton (BC1)
- QTS Miami (MIA1)
- 365 Data Centers Ft. Lauderdale (FLL)
- CoreSite - Reston (VA1)
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 14 ROAs.
- 104.234.102.0/24 · max length /24
- 107.148.105.0/24 · max length /24
- 108.165.47.0/24 · max length /24
- 108.186.90.0/24 · max length /24
- 142.111.46.0/24 · max length /24
- 144.225.147.0/24 · max length /24
- 157.254.174.0/24 · max length /24
- 2607:a2c0::/32 · max length /38
- 2607:a2c0:400::/38
- 2607:a2c0:800::/38
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS26141.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,304
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1
- Threat density
- 0.0434 %
- Routed prefixes
- 9
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 BGP neighbours.
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- RaiolaNetworks - Raiola Networks S.L. · AS56958
- SECUREBIT - Securebit AG · AS58057
- ONEPROVIDER-AS - BrainStorm Network, Inc · AS136258
- ROBOTSTXT - Robotstxt S.L · AS214855
- GAV-AS - Grachev Andrey Vladimirovich · AS218897
- VTS-SERVICES - VTS Services Inc · AS400731
- BIXCE - BIXCE Inc · AS401753
Reputation
15.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS26141 (CUBEPATH - CubePath, US) has a reputation score of 59.3 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 35.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- CubePath
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Tue, 12 Dec 2023 18:55:52 GMT
- Abuse contact
- admin@cubepath.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS26141 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.