Autonomous System
AS35810
Last fetched
AS35810 is operated by BIGTELECOM-AS - Big Telecom JSC, registered in RU, and announces 28 prefixes to 12 BGP neighbours. AS35810 has a reputation score of 16.7 (NEUTRAL); 1 of its 10,752 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 28
- BGP neighbours
- 12
- RPKI ROAs
- 3
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,581
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 11
- Facilities
- 62
- Internet exchanges
- 8
- Customer degree
- 6
- Peer degree
- 64
- Provider degree
- 7
- 37.233.116.0/24
- 37.233.117.0/24
- 37.233.118.0/24
- 37.233.119.0/24
- 87.255.0.0/23
- 87.255.2.0/24
- 87.255.2.0/23
- 87.255.3.0/24
- 87.255.4.0/22
- 87.255.8.0/24
- 87.255.9.0/24
- 87.255.8.0/22
- 87.255.12.0/22
- 87.255.16.0/24
- 87.255.17.0/24
- 87.255.18.0/23
- 87.255.16.0/21
- 87.255.20.0/22
- 87.255.24.0/21
- 185.233.192.0/24
- 185.233.193.0/24
- 185.233.192.0/22
- 185.233.194.0/24
- 185.233.195.0/24
- 195.191.238.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (8 total)
Facilities (62 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Moscow M9
- Speedbone Berlin
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- Dataplex Budapest
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- NewTelco Kiev
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- LIM Warsaw
- Sitel Bratislava
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Ucomline Kiev
- Moscow M10
- Moscow CSS MPS
- TELEPOINT Sofia Centre
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 3 of this network’s 3 ROAs.
- 2a11:ec0::/32 · max length /32
- 2a14:a085::/32 · max length /32
- 2a14:a086::/32 · max length /32
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS35810.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 10,752
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1
- Threat density
- 0.0093 %
- Routed prefixes
- 26
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 12 of this network’s 12 BGP neighbours.
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- ERTH-TRANSIT-AS - JSC "ER-Telecom Holding" · AS9049
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- INTERLAN-AS - LLC Company Interlan Communications · AS28738
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- INETCOM - INETCOM CARRIER LLC · AS35598
- W-IX_LTD - iHome LLC · AS50384
- GIGALINK-LTD-AS - GigaLink Ltd. · AS50771
- LCOM-AS - LCom LLC · AS50806
- Optima-AS - Optima Communications, LLC · AS52163
- ZELTELECOM-AS - OOO "Zeltelecom" · AS57652
Reputation
16.7reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS35810 (BIGTELECOM-AS - Big Telecom JSC, RU) has a reputation score of 56.6 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 53.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 65.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Big Telecom JSC
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 02 Nov 2005 10:09:30 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@bigtelecom.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS35810 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.