Autonomous System
AS35847
Last fetched
AS35847 is operated by AS-EFTL - Ezee Fiber, registered in US, and announces 93 prefixes to 28 BGP neighbours. AS35847 has a reputation score of 9.9 (REPUTABLE); 29 of its 240,640 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 93
- BGP neighbours
- 28
- RPKI ROAs
- 26
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 975
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 40
- Facilities
- 58
- Internet exchanges
- 9
- Customer degree
- 21
- Peer degree
- 26
- Provider degree
- 6
- 64.110.128.0/21
- 66.33.104.0/21
- 66.33.120.0/21
- 66.132.160.0/21
- 69.8.64.0/19
- 74.51.192.0/20
- 74.51.200.0/24
- 98.96.0.0/19
- 98.96.32.0/19
- 98.96.0.0/17
- 98.96.64.0/19
- 98.96.96.0/19
- 136.244.0.0/19
- 136.244.0.0/18
- 136.244.32.0/19
- 139.94.0.0/18
- 139.94.64.0/18
- 139.94.128.0/24
- 139.94.129.0/24
- 139.94.130.0/24
- 139.94.131.0/24
- 139.94.132.0/22
- 139.94.136.0/23
- 139.94.138.0/23
- 139.94.140.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (9 total)
Facilities (58 total)
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix DA3 - Dallas
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- PTOR1
- CoreSite - Denver (DE1)
- Netrality Houston - 1301 Fannin
- Digital Realty DFW (2323 Bryan St)
- Digital Realty CHI (350 E Cermak)
- Equinix DA - Dallas (previously Infomart Dallas)
- Equinix CH3 - Elk Grove
- CoreSite - Denver (DE2)
- Databank Houston Galleria (HOU5)
- Databank Houston West (HOU1) (HOU2)
- CyrusOne Dallas (Carrollton)
- EdgeConneX Portland (EDCPOR01)
- EdgeConneX Detroit (EDCDET01)
- 365 Data Centers Detroit (DT1)
- 123.NET - DC1 - 24700 Northwestern Hwy.
- Flexential - Dallas/Downtown (DAL01)
- Equinix DA6 - Dallas
- Data Foundry Houston 2
- Cologix DAL1
- Cologix DAL2
- Stack Infrastructure Portland PORO2
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 26 ROAs.
- 136.244.0.0/18 · max length /24
- 139.94.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 143.109.96.0/19 · max length /24
- 146.85.128.0/19 · max length /24
- 149.106.64.0/19 · max length /24
- 155.116.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 168.93.0.0/18 · max length /24
- 170.203.96.0/19 · max length /24
- 216.227.240.0/20 · max length /24
- 2606:a300::/32 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS35847.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 240,640
- Threat-listed addresses
- 29
- Threat density
- 0.0121 %
- Routed prefixes
- 74
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 28 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- PUREVOLTAGE - PureVoltage Hosting Inc. · AS971
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- ZAYO-6461 - Zayo Bandwidth · AS6461
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- NTHL - NETWORK TRANSIT HOLDINGS LLC · AS11042
- WIKIMEDIA - Wikimedia Foundation Inc. · AS14907
- CFISD - Cypress-Fairbanks ISD · AS26779
- COSL-01 - City of Sugar Land · AS27206
- WII - WholeSale Internet, Inc. · AS32097
- SMART-CITY-GBCC - SMART CITY NETWORKS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP · AS32779
- OIS-53-ASN - Optiquest Internet Services, Inc. · AS40667
- PVAMU - PRAIRIE VIEW A&M UNIVERSITY · AS46335
- NIXIHOST - NixiHost.com Incorporated · AS46505
- WHITESKY-COMMUNICATIONS-2 - WhiteSky Communications, LLC. · AS54119
- HCEC-HOUSTON-PRIMARY - Harris County Emergency Corps · AS54457
- TXNET - TXNet Communications LLC · AS62467
- STEWART-STEVENSON - Stewart & Stevenson LLC · AS63153
- AS63455 - C&J Spec-Rent Services, Inc. · AS63455
- SISD-ASN - Spring Independent School District · AS393383
- PSLIGHTWAVE - PS Lightwave · AS394437
- ZERO-ATTACK-VECTOR - Zero Attack Vector LLC · AS398549
- DARTNODE - Snaju Development · AS399646
- DAYNET-01 - Dayton · AS399920
Reputation
9.9reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS35847 (AS-EFTL - Ezee Fiber, US) has a reputation score of 70.2 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 74.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Ezee Fiber
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Thu, 24 Mar 2005 18:58:43 GMT
- Abuse contact
- noc@ezeefiber.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS35847 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.