Autonomous System
AS36992
Last fetched
AS36992 is operated by ETISALAT MISR - ETISALAT MISR, registered in EG, and announces 3,598 prefixes to 19 BGP neighbours. AS36992 has a reputation score of 7.3 (REPUTABLE); 118 of its 6,320,896 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 3,598
- BGP neighbours
- 19
- RPKI ROAs
- 52,767
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,810
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 17
- Facilities
- 2
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 16
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 4
- 41.64.2.0/23
- 41.64.24.0/21
- 41.64.32.0/22
- 41.64.40.0/21
- 41.64.52.0/22
- 41.64.56.0/21
- 41.64.70.0/24
- 41.64.71.0/24
- 41.64.0.0/16
- 41.64.170.0/23
- 41.64.172.0/22
- 41.64.176.0/23
- 41.64.191.0/24
- 41.64.192.0/24
- 41.64.194.0/24
- 41.64.195.0/24
- 41.64.196.0/24
- 41.65.0.0/24
- 41.65.1.0/24
- 41.65.2.0/23
- 41.65.3.0/24
- 41.65.4.0/24
- 41.65.6.0/24
- 41.65.10.0/24
- 41.65.14.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (2 total)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 52,767 ROAs.
- 102.56.0.0/13 · max length /24
- 105.200.0.0/13 · max length /24
- 105.80.0.0/12 · max length /24
- 154.236.0.0/14 · max length /24
- 156.160.0.0/11 · max length /24
- 194.79.96.0/19 · max length /24
- 197.120.0.0/13 · max length /24
- 197.192.0.0/13 · max length /24
- 2001:42b8::/32 · max length /64
- 213.152.64.0/19 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS36992.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 6,320,896
- Threat-listed addresses
- 118
- Threat density
- 0.0019 %
- Routed prefixes
- 1,945
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 19 of this network’s 19 BGP neighbours.
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- IDSC - IDSC · AS6127
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- TE-AS - IDDQD-AS · AS8452
- OCI - Options & Choices, Inc. · AS10241
- CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc. · AS14789
- Medianova - MEDIANOVA INTERNET HIZMETLERI VE TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI · AS21245
- AFMIC - AFMIC · AS25576
- Ministry of Communications and Information Technology - Ministry of Communications and Information Technology · AS31065
- City Stars - City Stars · AS31619
- ITWorx - ITWorx · AS36870
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Ministry of Foreign Affairs · AS37066
- ITS-AS-AP - ITS , Application Service Provider, · AS45246
- SA-1 - Hitachi Energy Holdings Ltd · AS214849
- Bank Misr S.A.E - Bank Misr S.A.E · AS328553
- Unipak Nile Ltd - Unipak Nile Ltd · AS328876
- Geidea Technology - Geidea Technology · AS328972
- Thndr Securities Brokerage - Thndr Securities Brokerage · AS329720
Reputation
7.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS36992 (ETISALAT MISR - ETISALAT MISR, EG) has a reputation score of 78.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ETISALAT MISR
- RIR
- AFRINIC
- Registered
- Mon, 10 Dec 2007 09:02:00 GMT
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS36992 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.