Autonomous System
AS47589
Last fetched
AS47589 is operated by KTC3G - Kuwait Telecommunications Company K.S.C.C., registered in KW, and announces 290 prefixes to 14 BGP neighbours. AS47589 has a reputation score of 10.1 (NEUTRAL); 115 of its 208,128 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 290
- BGP neighbours
- 14
- RPKI ROAs
- 380
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 4,240
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 5
- Facilities
- 21
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 6
- Provider degree
- 9
- 37.231.0.0/22
- 37.231.4.0/22
- 37.231.8.0/23
- 37.231.10.0/23
- 37.231.12.0/23
- 37.231.14.0/23
- 37.231.16.0/23
- 37.231.18.0/23
- 37.231.20.0/23
- 37.231.22.0/23
- 37.231.24.0/23
- 37.231.26.0/23
- 37.231.28.0/23
- 37.231.30.0/23
- 37.231.0.0/18
- 37.231.32.0/23
- 37.231.34.0/23
- 37.231.36.0/23
- 37.231.38.0/23
- 37.231.40.0/23
- 37.231.42.0/23
- 37.231.44.0/23
- 37.231.46.0/23
- 37.231.48.0/22
- 37.231.52.0/23
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.11
- Route leaks
- 6
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN, TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (21 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Amsterdam (AMS-1)
- Smartdc Rotterdam
- NorthC Amsterdam 1
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- Equinix DX1 - Dubai
- datamena DXA - Dubai
- Eurofiber Datacenter Rotterdam 2
- Equinix AM6 - Amsterdam, Duivendrechtsekade
- Greenhouse Datacenters DC2
- Global Zone Askar
- Qualitynet Rashid Abdulla DC
- FASTtelco DC Kuwait
- Equinix DX3 - Dubai
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 380 ROAs.
- 185.192.236.0/23 · max length /23
- 185.192.238.0/23 · max length /23
- 2a03:4780::/32 · max length /32
- 2a03:4781::/32 · max length /32
- 2a03:4782::/32 · max length /32
- 2a03:4783::/32 · max length /32
- 37.231.0.0/17 · max length /17
- 37.231.0.0/18 · max length /18
- 37.231.0.0/22 · max length /22
- 37.231.0.0/23 · max length /23
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS47589.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 208,128
- Threat-listed addresses
- 115
- Threat density
- 0.0553 %
- Routed prefixes
- 285
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 14 of this network’s 14 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- QA-ISP - Ooredoo Q.S.C. · AS8781
- Qnet - Quality Net General Trading & Contracting Company · AS9155
- CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc. · AS14789
- FLAG-AS - Flag Telecom UK Limited · AS15412
- DU-AS1 - Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC · AS15802
- ZEN-ECN - Zenlayer Inc · AS21859
- STC-IGW-AS - Saudi Telecom Company JSC · AS39386
- IQNETWORKS - IQ Networks for Data and Internet Services Ltd · AS44217
- VIVABH - STC BAHRAIN B.S.C CLOSED · AS51375
- ORCL-CHICAGO-PP - Oracle Corporation · AS54253
- ACE-AS-AP - ACE · AS139341
Reputation
10.1reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS47589 (KTC3G - Kuwait Telecommunications Company K.S.C.C., KW) has a reputation score of 69.8 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 65.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Kuwait Telecommunications Company K.S.C.C.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 17 Jul 2008 08:33:53 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@viva.com.kw
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS47589 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.