Autonomous System
AS48084
Last fetched
AS48084 is operated by UMLC - Uzhnie Magistraljnie Linii Svyazi LLC, registered in RU, and announces 2 prefixes to 36 BGP neighbours. AS48084 has a reputation score of 21.0 (SUSPICIOUS); 0 of its 256 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 2
- BGP neighbours
- 36
- RPKI ROAs
- 5
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 557
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 85
- Facilities
- 50
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 20
- Peer degree
- 25
- Provider degree
- 6
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.06
- Route leaks
- 3
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (50 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Speedbone Berlin
- Moscow M9
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- Dataplex Budapest
- NewTelco Kiev
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- Sitel Bratislava
- LIM Warsaw
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Ucomline Kiev
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
- Equinix SK2 - Stockholm, Sköndal
- TELEPOINT Sofia Centre
- Digita Helsinki Pasila Broadcasting Tower
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 5 of this network’s 5 ROAs.
- 185.214.244.0/22 · max length /24
- 185.214.244.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.214.245.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.214.246.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.214.247.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS48084.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 256
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 1
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 36 BGP neighbours.
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- CRELCOM-NET - CRELCOM LLC · AS6789
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- MM-AS - Meshnet ltd. · AS12773
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- BCLAN-AS - BCLan LLC · AS25591
- Fiord-AS - Fiord Networks, UAB · AS28917
- MF-MGSM-AS - PJSC MegaFon · AS31133
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- SEVSTAR - Lancom Ltd. · AS35816
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- UGLETELECOM-AS - STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE OF THE DONETSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC "UGLETELECOM" · AS39089
- DON-FTTH - Timer, LLC · AS41039
- FARLINE-AS - Ltd. "Cypher" · AS42239
- TRC-BRT-LLC - Teleradiocompany Bytradiotehnika Ltd. · AS47349
- YALTANET - TDV "Teleradio company "Yalta" LLC · AS47939
- KCT-AS - PE Tsibrankov Konstantin Igorevich · AS48004
- IPSVYAZ-AS - IPSvyaz OOO · AS48276
- CRISTAL-AS - Kozlova Larisa Petrovna · AS48722
- TRUENETWORK - Truenetwork LLC · AS49673
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- GIGAHOST - Gigahost AS · AS56655
- RETNRU-AS - JSC "RetnNet" · AS57304
- SEVTELECOM-AS - JSC Sevastopol Telekom · AS59833
Reputation
21.0reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)
AS48084 (UMLC - Uzhnie Magistraljnie Linii Svyazi LLC, RU) has a reputation score of 49.0 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 24.4/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Uzhnie Magistraljnie Linii Svyazi LLC
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Fri, 10 Oct 2008 09:46:14 GMT
- Abuse contact
- lir@umlc.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS48084 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.