Autonomous System
AS49505
Last fetched
AS49505 is operated by SELECTEL - JSC Selectel, registered in RU, and announces 670 prefixes to 28 BGP neighbours. AS49505 has a reputation score of 13.4 (NEUTRAL).
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 670
- BGP neighbours
- 28
- RPKI ROAs
- 823
- MOAS conflicts
- 6
- Facilities
- 89
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- 5.8.72.0/24
- 5.8.73.0/24
- 5.8.75.0/24
- 5.8.72.0/21
- 5.8.76.0/24
- 5.8.77.0/24
- 5.8.78.0/24
- 5.44.40.0/23
- 5.44.45.0/24
- 5.53.120.0/21
- 5.53.124.0/23
- 5.101.48.0/22
- 5.159.100.0/23
- 5.159.100.0/22
- 5.159.102.0/23
- 5.178.80.0/24
- 5.178.81.0/24
- 5.178.83.0/24
- 5.178.80.0/21
- 5.178.86.0/24
- 5.178.87.0/24
- 5.182.4.0/24
- 5.182.4.0/23
- 5.182.5.0/24
- 5.182.4.0/22
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (7 total)
Facilities (89 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- Moscow M9
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- NTT Frankfurt 1 Data Center (FRA1)
- NewColo Frankfurt
- Dataplex Budapest
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- NewTelco Kiev
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Sitel Bratislava
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 823 ROAs.
- 154.205.244.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.205.245.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.205.246.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.205.247.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.209.208.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.209.209.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.209.210.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.209.211.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.209.212.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.209.213.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS49505.
Blast radius
Blast radius is temporarily unavailable.
The threat-density procedure returned no result for this ASN. Refresh in a moment to retry — fresh data is fetched on the next visit.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 28 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- MTS - MTS PJSC · AS8359
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- TRANSTELECOM - Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom · AS20485
- UK-PS-Group - UK PS Group Ltd · AS20611
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- KASSIRRU-AS - LLC "Kassir.ru - National Ticket Operator" · AS21314
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- StormNetworks - Storm Networks LLC · AS43298
- SELECTEL-MSK - JSC Selectel · AS50340
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- SKYDNS-AS - SkyDNS Ltd · AS51289
- GIGAHOST - Gigahost AS · AS56655
- RETNRU-AS - JSC "RetnNet" · AS57304
- IQWEB - IQWeb FZ-LLC · AS59692
- DGTL - DGTL TECH UK LLP · AS61087
- ASN62300-AS - Address Limited · AS62300
- MADRIGAL-AS - MADRIGAL LLC · AS199184
- tutaev-dev - Adam Muratovich Tutaev · AS199851
- MKK-LUNA - Luna LLC · AS200172
- OOOVPS-AS - OOO VPS · AS200487
- compubyte-as - Compubyte Limited · AS204343
- gibirnet-tr - GIBIRNET ILETISIM HIZMETLERI SANAYI VE TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI · AS208972
MOAS / hijack watch
6 announced prefixes conflict with AS49505 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
13.4reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS49505 (SELECTEL - JSC Selectel, RU) has a reputation score of 63.1 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 54.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- JSC Selectel
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 18 Jun 2009 15:53:26 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@selectel.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS49505 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.