Autonomous System
AS51907
Last fetched
AS51907 is operated by CH-ZG - Kanton Zug, registered in CH, and announces 3 prefixes to 19 BGP neighbours. AS51907 has a reputation score of 7.3 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 6,144 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 3
- BGP neighbours
- 19
- RPKI ROAs
- 4
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 9,662
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 2
- Facilities
- 72
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 1
- Peer degree
- 1,663
- Provider degree
- 5
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (72 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix ZH2 - Zurich
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- IWB Datacenter Basel
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- colobern.ch Bern
- NTT Frankfurt 1 Data Center (FRA1)
- NewColo Frankfurt
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 4 of this network’s 4 ROAs.
- 193.134.16.0/20 · max length /24
- 193.134.8.0/21 · max length /24
- 2a10:8240::/29 · max length /48
- 2a10:8244::/30 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS51907.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 6,144
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 2
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 19 of this network’s 19 BGP neighbours.
- XTOM-V-PS - xTom OU · AS3204
- RIPE-NCC-AS - Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) · AS3333
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- CONVERGE-AS - Converge ICT Solutions Inc. · AS17639
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- NASSIST-AS - Netassist International EOOD · AS29632
- HIVANE - Hivane Association · AS34019
- AS34288 - Kantonsschule Zug · AS34288
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- NTSWorkspaceAG-AS39040 - NTS workspace AG · AS39040
- team_blue - team.blue NV · AS48185
- TKSWF-AS - Stadtwerke Feldkirch · AS48362
- CUSTDC - CustodianDC Limited · AS50300
- SWISSIX-OUTREACH - SwissIX Internet Exchange · AS58115
- KANTONAR - Kanton Appenzell Ausserrhoden · AS211452
- RISSON - Marc Schmitt · AS212024
- CH-ZG-ANYCAST-0 - Kanton Zug · AS219256
Reputation
7.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS51907 (CH-ZG - Kanton Zug, CH) has a reputation score of 78.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Kanton Zug
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 29 Aug 2022 14:03:07 GMT
- Abuse contact
- aio.abuse@zg.ch
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS51907 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.