Autonomous System
AS5580
Last fetched
AS5580 is operated by GTT-ASIA - GTT Communications Netherlands B.V., registered in NL, and announces 36 prefixes to 32 BGP neighbours. AS5580 has a reputation score of 7.3 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 20,992 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 36
- BGP neighbours
- 32
- RPKI ROAs
- 17
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 705
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 63
- Facilities
- 27
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 31
- Peer degree
- 32
- Provider degree
- 2
- 59.191.240.0/20
- 64.235.224.0/23
- 64.235.225.0/24
- 64.235.227.0/24
- 64.235.228.0/24
- 64.235.230.0/24
- 64.235.232.0/24
- 64.235.234.0/23
- 64.235.236.0/24
- 64.235.238.0/23
- 64.235.240.0/23
- 64.235.244.0/24
- 64.235.244.0/23
- 64.235.245.0/24
- 64.235.246.0/24
- 64.235.248.0/24
- 64.235.249.0/24
- 64.235.250.0/23
- 64.235.252.0/22
- 69.31.128.0/22
- 69.31.132.0/23
- 69.31.137.0/24
- 69.31.138.0/24
- 69.31.139.0/24
- 69.31.140.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.02
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (27 total)
- Equinix HK1 - Hong Kong
- Equinix TY1 - Tokyo
- MEGA-i (iAdvantage Hong Kong)
- Equinix SG1 - Singapore
- Global Switch Singapore
- Equinix TY2 - Tokyo
- Equinix SG2 - Singapore
- AT TOKYO (CC1/CC2)
- Equinix HK2 - Hong Kong
- NTT DATA Dojima (building #4)
- Equinix TY3 - Tokyo
- COLT in Asia Tokyo Data Center 1 (TDC1)
- Equinix TY4 - Tokyo
- Equinix SG3 - Singapore
- Equinix HK3 - Hong Kong
- Equinix TY7 - Tokyo
- Equinix TY5 - Tokyo
- Equinix TY6 - Tokyo
- Equinix TY10 - Tokyo
- Equinix TY8 - Tokyo
- Equinix TY9 - Tokyo
- Equinix HK5 - Hong Kong
- Equinix SG4 - Singapore
- Equinix TY11 - Tokyo
- Equinix SG5 - Singapore
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 17 ROAs.
- 103.207.156.0/23 · max length /23
- 103.230.248.0/22 · max length /22
- 103.230.249.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.232.34.0/23 · max length /23
- 103.47.76.0/23 · max length /23
- 103.53.152.0/23 · max length /23
- 203.95.212.0/22 · max length /22
- 59.191.240.0/20 · max length /20
- 69.31.128.0/22
- 69.31.132.0/23
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS5580.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 20,992
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 35
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 32 BGP neighbours.
- ROCKWELLCOLLINS-AS - Rockwell Collins, Inc. · AS1341
- DOW - The Dow Chemical Company · AS1678
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- PSINet-Europe - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3291
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- STARHUB-INTERNET - StarHub Ltd · AS4657
- FACTSET - FactSet Research Systems, Inc. · AS6404
- SPEEDCAST-AP - SPEEDCAST Limited · AS9229
- BSNL-NIB - National Internet Backbone · AS9829
- AFP-NET - AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE · AS10806
- PWLLP-AS001 - Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, Inc. · AS11941
- CATON - CATO NETWORKS LTD · AS13150
- CPLP-ASN - Centerbridge Partners, L.P. · AS13464
- EPIQSYSTEMS - EPIQ Systems, Inc · AS16645
- DX-SECURE - DOXX.NET CORPORATION · AS16740
- SEAGATE-USA-CA-1 - Seagate Technology LLC · AS18723
- GOOGLE-2 - Google LLC · AS19527
- IPNETZONE-ASN - IPNetZone · AS20077
- TRANSTELECOM - Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom · AS20485
- APOLLONYC - Apollo Management, L.P. · AS21509
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IPC-NETWORK-SERVICES-INC - IPC Network Services Inc. · AS25896
- FDCSERVERS - FDCservers.net · AS30058
- HUL-IT-IN - Mobius Towers V Floor · AS56077
- AS-PUBMATIC - PubMatic, Inc. · AS62713
Reputation
7.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS5580 (GTT-ASIA - GTT Communications Netherlands B.V., NL) has a reputation score of 78.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- GTT Communications Netherlands B.V.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 08 Apr 2009 11:42:46 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@gtt.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS5580 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.