Autonomous System
AS57208
Last fetched
AS57208 is operated by Advania-IMP-SE - Advania Sverige AB, registered in SE, and announces 13 prefixes to 14 BGP neighbours. AS57208 has a reputation score of 10.5 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 5,888 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 13
- BGP neighbours
- 14
- RPKI ROAs
- 2
- MOAS conflicts
- 20
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 10,808
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 2
- Facilities
- 16
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 1
- Peer degree
- 19
- Provider degree
- 0
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (16 total)
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- STOKAB KN6, Hammarby
- STOKAB KN5, Södermalm
- Gothnet DC Marieholm
- Equinix SK2 - Stockholm, Sköndal
- STOKAB KN7, Östermalm
- GlobalConnect Sätra
- Glesys Stockholm 1
- Stockholm/B
- Stockholm/C
- Vaultica Data Centers | STO01
- Obenet Kista Gate
- Conapto Stockholm Nord (Sollentuna)
- Conapto Stockholm Syd (Sätra)
- Glesys Falkenberg 2
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 2 of this network’s 2 ROAs.
- 194.132.36.0/22 · max length /24
- 62.201.42.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS57208.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 5,888
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 13
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 14 of this network’s 14 BGP neighbours.
- SWIPNET - Tele2 Sverige AB · AS1257
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- ADVANIA-AS - Advania Sverige AB · AS25146
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
- F5 - F5 Networks SARL · AS35280
- BLIX - Blix Solutions AS · AS50304
- ITM-SE - Advania Sverige AB · AS51929
- CORE-TELECOMPUTING-SE - Advania Sverige AB · AS58343
MOAS / hijack watch
20 announced prefixes conflict with AS57208 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
- 62.201.42.0/24
- 84.17.192.0/19
- 89.255.243.0/24
- 89.255.240.0/21
- 89.255.245.0/24
- 91.215.92.0/22
- 91.218.205.0/24
- 91.218.204.0/22
- 158.105.167.0/24
- 185.29.112.0/24
- 185.29.112.0/22
- 185.29.115.0/24
- 185.134.92.0/22
- 192.36.189.0/24
- 192.121.173.0/24
- 192.165.73.0/24
- 193.182.224.0/22
- 194.14.78.0/24
- 194.103.224.0/22
- 213.108.96.0/21
Reputation
10.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS57208 (Advania-IMP-SE - Advania Sverige AB, SE) has a reputation score of 69.1 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 70.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Advania Sverige AB
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 22 Aug 2011 15:15:05 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@advania.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS57208 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.