Autonomous System
AS60439
Last fetched
AS60439 is operated by SERVERNET-AS - SERVERNET INTERNET LIMITED, registered in GB, and announces 43 prefixes to 16 BGP neighbours. AS60439 has a reputation score of 11.5 (NEUTRAL); 7 of its 11,776 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 43
- BGP neighbours
- 16
- RPKI ROAs
- 59
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,291
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 8
- Facilities
- 91
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 7
- Peer degree
- 82
- Provider degree
- 3
- 45.10.76.0/22
- 45.82.92.0/24
- 45.82.93.0/24
- 45.82.94.0/24
- 45.82.95.0/24
- 45.90.148.0/24
- 45.90.149.0/24
- 45.90.150.0/24
- 45.90.151.0/24
- 45.94.80.0/24
- 45.94.81.0/24
- 45.94.82.0/24
- 45.94.83.0/24
- 45.131.112.0/24
- 45.131.113.0/24
- 45.131.114.0/24
- 45.131.115.0/24
- 45.136.212.0/24
- 45.136.213.0/24
- 45.136.214.0/24
- 45.136.215.0/24
- 45.141.224.0/22
- 45.151.80.0/24
- 45.151.81.0/24
- 45.151.82.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (91 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
- BIT-1
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Speedbone Berlin
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Moscow M9
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- InterDC Doetinchem
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 59 ROAs.
- 23.147.236.0/24 · max length /24
- 139.28.16.0/22 · max length /24
- 151.243.150.0/24 · max length /24
- 151.243.28.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.160.22.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.160.23.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.160.30.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.160.31.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.117.73.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a13:8240:100::/40 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS60439.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 11,776
- Threat-listed addresses
- 7
- Threat density
- 0.0594 %
- Routed prefixes
- 37
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 16 of this network’s 16 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- D4-NETW - D4 Networks L.L.C. · AS14475
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- Servperso_Systems - Sarah Rossius trading as Servperso Systems · AS34872
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- CDN77 - Datacamp Limited · AS60068
- NOHAVPS-LLC - NOHAVPS LLC · AS63025
- VATORA - VATORA LIMITED · AS199738
- AceRDP - AceRDP Ltd · AS206479
- PEACHY - PEACHY SERVERS LIMITED · AS207477
- Alpenhost - Ronald Agorsah trading as Alpenhost e.U. · AS208024
- OZONTI-NETWORK-LLC - OZONTI NETWORK LLC · AS402072
- BENTHOST - Benthost LLC · AS402162
Reputation
11.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS60439 (SERVERNET-AS - SERVERNET INTERNET LIMITED, GB) has a reputation score of 67.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 65.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- SERVERNET INTERNET LIMITED
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 30 Nov 2023 09:16:13 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@server.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS60439 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.