Autonomous System
AS61071
Last fetched
AS61071 is operated by NETBOX-AS - NETBOX LTD, registered in BG, and announces 19 prefixes to 12 BGP neighbours. AS61071 has a reputation score of 16.7 (NEUTRAL); 15 of its 6,400 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 19
- BGP neighbours
- 12
- RPKI ROAs
- 22
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,435
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 12
- Facilities
- 255
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 9
- Peer degree
- 9
- Provider degree
- 4
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (255 total)
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix DA3 - Dallas
- Global Switch Amsterdam
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 22 ROAs.
- 178.217.88.0/22 · max length /24
- 178.217.90.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.134.228.0/22 · max length /24
- 185.18.230.0/23 · max length /24
- 77.78.25.0/24 · max length /24
- 77.78.39.0/24 · max length /24
- 77.78.40.0/24 · max length /24
- 77.78.41.0/24 · max length /24
- 77.78.50.0/24 · max length /24
- 77.78.52.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS61071.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 6,400
- Threat-listed addresses
- 15
- Threat density
- 0.2344 %
- Routed prefixes
- 19
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 12 of this network’s 12 BGP neighbours.
- ZET-NET - INTERKVM HOST SRL · AS6204
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- VIVACOM-AS - Vivacom Bulgaria EAD · AS8866
- MultiLink - Multilink Ltd. · AS35448
- ICONNECT-AS - ICONNECT-AS · AS35773
- nastech - Nastech OOD · AS39024
- NBIS-AS - NBI Systems Ltd. · AS39396
- RU-NET-AS - University of Ruse "Angel Kanchev" · AS48155
- TELEHOUSE-AS - Telehouse EAD · AS57344
- ILLUSION-NET - ILLUSION NET EOOD · AS61996
- Boramax - Boramax ltd · AS212652
- CloudCraft-AS - CloudCraft Ltd. · AS218951
Reputation
16.7reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS61071 (NETBOX-AS - NETBOX LTD, BG) has a reputation score of 56.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 42.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- NETBOX LTD
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 27 Feb 2013 12:16:55 GMT
- Abuse contact
- support@netbox-bg.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS61071 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.