Autonomous System
AS9269
Last fetched
AS9269 is operated by HKBN-AS-AP - Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd., registered in HK, and announces 208 prefixes to 22 BGP neighbours. AS9269 has a reputation score of 11.3 (NEUTRAL); 232 of its 1,720,320 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 208
- BGP neighbours
- 22
- RPKI ROAs
- 14,005
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 509
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 91
- Facilities
- 135
- Internet exchanges
- 16
- Customer degree
- 2
- Peer degree
- 127
- Provider degree
- 15
- 14.136.0.0/24
- 14.136.0.0/18
- 14.136.64.0/18
- 14.136.0.0/16
- 14.136.131.0/24
- 14.136.132.0/24
- 14.136.134.0/24
- 14.136.136.0/24
- 14.136.137.0/24
- 14.136.139.0/24
- 14.136.128.0/18
- 14.136.192.0/18
- 14.198.0.0/18
- 14.198.128.0/18
- 14.198.192.0/19
- 14.198.224.0/20
- 14.198.232.0/21
- 14.199.1.0/24
- 14.199.0.0/18
- 14.199.64.0/20
- 14.199.80.0/24
- 14.199.81.0/24
- 14.199.82.0/24
- 14.199.83.0/24
- 14.199.64.0/18
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (16 total)
Facilities (135 total)
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- Equinix LA2 - Los Angeles
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- KINX Dogok
- Equinix HK1 - Hong Kong
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 14,005 ROAs.
- 103.243.0.0/22 · max length /24
- 103.84.32.0/22 · max length /24
- 110.235.0.0/17 · max length /24
- 113.10.128.0/17 · max length /24
- 119.246.0.0/15 · max length /15
- 119.246.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 119.247.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 123.1.128.0/17 · max length /24
- 123.202.0.0/15 · max length /15
- 123.202.0.0/16 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS9269.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,720,320
- Threat-listed addresses
- 232
- Threat density
- 0.0135 %
- Routed prefixes
- 207
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 22 of this network’s 22 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- CW - IDDQD-AS · AS1273
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- HKIX-RS1 - Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1 · AS4635
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- SINGTEL-AS-AP - Singapore Telecommunications Ltd · AS7473
- AARNET-AS-AP - Australian Academic and Research Network (AARNet) · AS7575
- MTS - MTS PJSC · AS8359
- HKBNES-AS-AP - HKBN Enterprise Solutions HK Limited · AS9381
- HKBN-AS-AP - HK Broadband Network Ltd. · AS10103
- ABOVE-AS-AP - AboveNet Communications Taiwan · AS17408
- CTGNet - CTGNet · AS23764
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- DCS1PTELTD-AS-AP - DCS1 Pte. Ltd. · AS37989
- NEWMEDIAEXPRESS-AS-AP - NewMedia Express Pte Ltd · AS38001
- TKSWF-AS - Stadtwerke Feldkirch · AS48362
Reputation
11.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS9269 (HKBN-AS-AP - Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd., HK) has a reputation score of 67.3 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 65.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Hong Kong Broadband Network Limited
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:30 GMT
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@hkbn.com.hk
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS9269 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.