Autonomous System
AS931
Last fetched
AS931 is operated by HYONIX - Hyonix, registered in SG, and announces 268 prefixes to 25 BGP neighbours. AS931 has a reputation score of 12.8 (NEUTRAL); 136 of its 68,096 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 268
- BGP neighbours
- 25
- RPKI ROAs
- 241
- MOAS conflicts
- 35
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,857
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 17
- Facilities
- 86
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 12
- Peer degree
- 33
- Provider degree
- 11
- 5.226.52.0/24
- 5.226.53.0/24
- 5.226.54.0/24
- 5.226.55.0/24
- 5.226.138.0/24
- 5.252.165.0/24
- 5.252.166.0/24
- 5.252.167.0/24
- 31.216.59.0/24
- 38.240.32.0/24
- 38.240.33.0/24
- 38.240.34.0/24
- 38.240.35.0/24
- 38.240.36.0/24
- 38.240.37.0/24
- 38.240.38.0/24
- 38.240.39.0/24
- 38.240.40.0/24
- 38.240.41.0/24
- 38.240.42.0/24
- 38.240.43.0/24
- 38.240.44.0/24
- 38.240.45.0/24
- 38.240.46.0/24
- 38.240.47.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.05
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (86 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- BIT-1
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Equinix HK1 - Hong Kong
- InterDC Doetinchem
- Redcentric London Data Centre
- WIIT Datacenter DUS1, DUS2, DUS3, DUS4, DUS6, DUS7
- NTT Frankfurt 1 Data Center (FRA1)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 241 ROAs.
- 103.131.130.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.131.131.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.141.235.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.142.167.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.144.51.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.199.98.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.199.99.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.96.80.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.96.81.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.96.82.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS931.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 68,096
- Threat-listed addresses
- 136
- Threat density
- 0.1997 %
- Routed prefixes
- 266
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 25 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- GOCODEIT-EDGE - GoCodeIT Inc · AS835
- DMIT - DMIT Cloud Services · AS906
- MISAKA - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS917
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- XTOM - xTom Pty Ltd · AS8888
- 123NET - 123.Net, Inc. · AS12129
- TERASWITCH - TeraSwitch Networks Inc. · AS20326
- MNI-AS-AP - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS23961
- BANDWIDTH-AS - Hydra Communications Ltd · AS25369
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- ERANIUM - Eranium B.V. · AS35133
- MISAKA - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS35487
- SYNLINQ - Oliver Horscht trading as "SYNLINQ" · AS44486
- MISAKA-ANYCAST - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS50069
- MISAKA - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS57695
- MISAKA-UK-AS - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS58313
- GSLNETWORKS-AS-AP - GSL Networks Pty LTD · AS137409
- KRIXEPTELTD-AS-AP - Krixe Pte. Ltd. · AS139601
- NEXTERA-AS-AP - Next Era Pte. Ltd. · AS153325
- HYONIX - Krixe Pte. Ltd. · AS213122
- ZESTY-ASN - Cheuk Wang Wu trading as Zesty Technologies · AS215081
- HYONIX-EDGE - Hyonix · AS399114
- IGNERO - Hyonix · AS400061
MOAS / hijack watch
35 announced prefixes conflict with AS931 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
- 38.240.49.0/24
- 38.240.50.0/24
- 38.240.51.0/24
- 38.255.36.0/24
- 38.255.37.0/24
- 38.255.38.0/24
- 38.255.51.0/24
- 38.255.52.0/24
- 43.225.89.0/24
- 45.61.171.0/24
- 45.143.146.0/24
- 64.112.86.0/24
- 66.118.237.0/24
- 103.104.248.0/24
- 104.224.29.0/24
- 104.249.130.0/24
- 130.51.40.0/24
- 130.51.41.0/24
- 144.172.72.0/24
- 161.129.33.0/24
- 161.129.36.0/24
- 161.129.37.0/24
- 161.129.38.0/24
- 161.129.40.0/24
- 161.129.44.0/24
Reputation
12.8reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS931 (HYONIX - Hyonix, SG) has a reputation score of 64.4 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 57.5/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Hyonix
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Thu, 16 Jun 2022 19:04:55 GMT
- Abuse contact
- report@ipcontacts.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS931 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.