Autonomous System
AS210464
Last fetched
AS210464 is operated by AVSISP - ANDREW KRISTULI, registered in AL, and announces 35 prefixes to 15 BGP neighbours. AS210464 has a reputation score of 14.2 (NEUTRAL); 5 of its 1,792 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 35
- BGP neighbours
- 15
- RPKI ROAs
- 41
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,187
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 14
- Facilities
- 31
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- Customer degree
- 5
- Peer degree
- 30
- Provider degree
- 2
- 31.59.141.0/24
- 31.59.164.0/24
- 82.108.121.0/24
- 85.155.228.0/24
- 87.83.70.0/24
- 195.144.24.0/24
- 217.216.230.0/24
- 2602:f704:c00::/38
- 2a0a:79c7:f100::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:f200::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:f300::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:f400::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:f500::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:f600::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:f700::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:f800::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:fa00::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:fb00::/40
- 2a0a:79c7:ff00::/40
- 2a0f:6284:f::/48
- 2a10:fa81:b00::/40
- 2a14:7580:c000::/40
- 2a14:7580:c300::/40
- 2a14:7580:ff99::/48
- 2a14:7583::/39
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.04
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN, TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (7 total)
Facilities (31 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- nLighten Amsterdam AMS1
- NXDATA-2 Bucharest (BUH2)
- NorthC Amsterdam 1
- Green Datacenter ZRH1 (fka: Green Lupfig)
- Equinix AM11 - Amsterdam, Lemelerbergweg
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- ColoCenter Zoetermeer
- DFDC The Hague
- Eurofiber Datacenter Rotterdam 2
- Equinix AM6 - Amsterdam, Duivendrechtsekade
- RASH - ANIX
- Equinix AM4 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- Tirana DataCom
- Neotel DC Skopje
- Greenhouse Datacenters DC2
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 41 ROAs.
- 2602:f704:c00::/38 · max length /128
- 195.144.24.0/24 · max length /32
- 217.216.230.0/24 · max length /24
- 217.60.96.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a0a:79c7:f100::/40 · max length /40
- 2a0a:79c7:f200::/40 · max length /40
- 2a0a:79c7:f300::/40 · max length /40
- 2a0a:79c7:f400::/40 · max length /128
- 2a0a:79c7:f500::/40 · max length /40
- 2a0a:79c7:f600::/40 · max length /40
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS210464.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,792
- Threat-listed addresses
- 5
- Threat density
- 0.2790 %
- Routed prefixes
- 7
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 15 of this network’s 15 BGP neighbours.
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- INTER-IX - InterEdge B.V. · AS56584
- GSLNETWORKS-AS-AP - GSL Networks Pty LTD · AS137409
- zGato - Marc Gomez · AS205563
- LSG - Lungu Stefan Gabriel · AS205941
- ShapeShifter - HASAN CAGRI AKSU · AS208487
- WMJ-AS - Mingjie Wu · AS212985
- rs - RS Computers L.L.C · AS213900
- APIVERSA - API VERSA OU · AS214976
- SVR4U-AS - BRANDON MAXWELL LOOI · AS219206
- BIXCE - BIXCE Inc · AS401753
Reputation
14.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS210464 (AVSISP - ANDREW KRISTULI, AL) has a reputation score of 61.7 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 42.6/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ANDREW KRISTULI
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 17 Nov 2021 10:45:10 GMT
- Abuse contact
- noc@avsisp.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS210464 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.