Autonomous System
AS23724
Last fetched
AS23724 is operated by CHINANET-IDC-BJ-AP - IDC, China Telecommunications Corporation, registered in CN, and announces 897 prefixes to 14 BGP neighbours. AS23724 has a reputation score of 12.5 (NEUTRAL); 338 of its 2,876,160 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 897
- BGP neighbours
- 14
- RPKI ROAs
- 914
- MOAS conflicts
- 191
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,906
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 16
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 14
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 2
- 1.203.94.0/24
- 1.203.95.0/24
- 1.203.115.0/24
- 1.203.124.0/22
- 36.110.128.0/19
- 36.110.160.0/19
- 36.110.186.0/24
- 36.110.192.0/24
- 36.110.192.0/19
- 36.110.226.0/24
- 36.110.227.0/24
- 36.110.224.0/19
- 36.111.80.0/24
- 36.111.81.0/24
- 36.111.82.0/23
- 36.111.88.0/24
- 36.111.148.0/24
- 36.111.149.0/24
- 36.111.150.0/23
- 36.112.128.0/24
- 36.112.129.0/24
- 36.112.130.0/24
- 36.112.131.0/24
- 36.112.132.0/24
- 36.112.133.0/24
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 914 ROAs.
- 1.203.115.0/24 · max length /24
- 1.203.124.0/22 · max length /22
- 1.203.94.0/24 · max length /24
- 1.203.95.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.124.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 101.124.0.0/20 · max length /20
- 101.124.19.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.124.22.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.124.62.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.198.0.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS23724.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,876,160
- Threat-listed addresses
- 338
- Threat density
- 0.0118 %
- Routed prefixes
- 809
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 14 of this network’s 14 BGP neighbours.
- CHINANET-BACKBONE - No.31,Jin-rong Street · AS4134
- CHINATELECOM-CORE-WAN-CN2 - China Telecom Next Generation Carrier Network · AS4809
- CHINA-ABITCOOL - Abitcool(China) Inc. · AS9308
- FibrLINK - Beijing FibrLINK Networks Co.,Ltd. · AS9814
- ALIBABA-CN-NET - Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising Co.,Ltd. · AS37963
- Baidu - Beijing Baidu Netcom Science and Technology Co., Ltd. · AS38365
- TENCENT-NET-AP - Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited · AS45090
- HWCSNET - Huawei Cloud Service data center · AS55990
- SHUJUJIA - Beijing ShuJuJia Technology Co., Ltd. · AS56019
- BJKSCNET - Beijing Kingsoft Cloud Internet Technology Co., Ltd · AS59019
- MMAISNET - Microsoft Mobile Alliance Internet Services Co., Ltd · AS59067
- XJKJ - Beijing Xiaoju Science and Technology Co., Ltd. · AS63646
- IQIYI-AS-AP - Beijing IQIYI Science & Technology Co., Ltd. · AS133865
- VOLCANO-ENGINE - Beijing Volcano Engine Technology Co., Ltd. · AS137718
MOAS / hijack watch
191 announced prefixes conflict with AS23724 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
- 43.196.232.0/22
- 43.231.160.0/24
- 43.231.161.0/24
- 43.231.162.0/24
- 43.231.163.0/24
- 43.231.167.0/24
- 43.231.168.0/24
- 43.231.169.0/24
- 43.231.170.0/24
- 43.247.188.0/22
- 49.4.32.0/20
- 54.222.46.0/23
- 54.222.48.0/24
- 54.222.49.0/24
- 54.222.50.0/24
- 54.222.51.0/24
- 54.222.52.0/24
- 54.222.53.0/24
- 54.222.52.0/22
- 54.222.54.0/24
- 54.222.55.0/24
- 54.222.65.0/24
- 54.222.89.0/24
- 54.222.96.0/24
- 54.222.97.0/24
Reputation
12.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS23724 (CHINANET-IDC-BJ-AP - IDC, China Telecommunications Corporation, CN) has a reputation score of 65.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 73.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- IDC, China Telecommunications Corporation
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:35 GMT
- Abuse contact
- anti-spam@chinatelecom.cn
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS23724 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.