Autonomous System
AS4809
Last fetched
AS4809 is operated by CHINATELECOM-CORE-WAN-CN2 - China Telecom Next Generation Carrier Network, registered in CN, and announces 434 prefixes to 46 BGP neighbours. AS4809 has a reputation score of 9.9 (REPUTABLE); 24 of its 588,800 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 434
- BGP neighbours
- 46
- RPKI ROAs
- 3,205
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 899
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 45
- Facilities
- 31
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 32
- Peer degree
- 36
- Provider degree
- 13
- 1.71.103.0/24
- 1.71.119.0/24
- 1.81.92.0/24
- 1.81.93.0/24
- 1.203.112.0/24
- 1.203.112.0/23
- 1.203.113.0/24
- 5.10.138.0/24
- 5.10.139.0/24
- 5.10.140.0/24
- 5.10.143.0/24
- 27.148.22.0/24
- 27.148.23.0/24
- 27.148.248.0/21
- 27.156.44.0/23
- 27.191.140.0/24
- 36.1.209.0/24
- 36.1.210.0/23
- 36.112.212.0/24
- 58.43.192.0/18
- 58.49.108.0/24
- 58.209.172.0/23
- 58.209.176.0/22
- 58.209.179.0/24
- 58.221.146.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.18
- Origin mismatches
- 1
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (31 total)
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- MEGA-i (iAdvantage Hong Kong)
- Equinix SG1 - Singapore
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA2)
- Global Switch Singapore
- Coresite - Milpitas (SV2)
- Equinix SG2 - Singapore
- Teraco Johannesburg Campus, South Africa
- 1-Net East
- Equinix SP2 - São Paulo
- SmartHub Fujairah
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV4)
- Africa Data Centres, Nairobi NBO1, Kenya
- Equinix SG3 - Singapore
- Digital Realty Singapore SIN10
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV3)
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV7)
- Digital Realty Singapore SIN11
- Racks Central
- STT Singapore 5
- Keppel Data Centres | Keppel DC Singapore 1
- NeutraDC SNG-3
- Epsilon Global Hubs Singapore
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Singapore (SIN-1)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 3,205 ROAs.
- 154.72.42.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.72.47.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.83.28.0/24 · max length /24
- 156.238.20.0/22 · max length /24
- 156.242.8.0/24 · max length /24
- 45.195.4.0/22 · max length /24
- 45.195.6.0/24 · max length /24
- 1.203.112.0/23 · max length /23
- 1.203.112.0/24 · max length /24
- 1.203.113.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS4809.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 588,800
- Threat-listed addresses
- 24
- Threat density
- 0.0041 %
- Routed prefixes
- 239
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 46 BGP neighbours.
- ROGERS-COMMUNICATIONS - Rogers Communications Canada Inc. · AS812
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS3320
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- CHINANET-BACKBONE - No.31,Jin-rong Street · AS4134
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- CHINANET-SH-AP - China Telecom (Group) · AS4812
- CHINA169-Backbone - CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone · AS4837
- CNIX-AP - China Networks Inter-Exchange · AS4847
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- AARNET-AS-AP - Australian Academic and Research Network (AARNet) · AS7575
- HUTCHISON-AS-AP - HGC Global Communications Limited · AS9304
- TRANSTELECOM - Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom · AS20485
- CHINANET-IDC-BJ-AP - IDC, China Telecommunications Corporation · AS23724
- CTGNet - CTGNet · AS23764
- WEBERCLOUD - weber.digital GmbH · AS35710
- CTUSA - CHINA TELECOM (AMERICAS) CORPORATION · AS36678
- RBCN-NET - Bosch (China) Investment Ltd. · AS38378
- CNSERVERS - CNSERVERS LLC · AS40065
- PEG-SV - PEG TECH INC · AS54600
- CHINATELECOM-CDMANetwork-BG-Beijing - China Telecom · AS58517
- CHINATELECOM-CDMANetwork-BG-Guangzhou - China Telecom · AS58518
- CHINATELECOM-Ctcloud - Cloud Computing Corporation · AS58519
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS4809 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
9.9reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS4809 (CHINATELECOM-CORE-WAN-CN2 - China Telecom Next Generation Carrier Network, CN) has a reputation score of 70.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 85.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- China Telecom Next Generation Carrier Network
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:27 GMT
- Abuse contact
- anti-spam@chinatelecom.cn
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS4809 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.