Autonomous System
AS38365
Last fetched
AS38365 is operated by Baidu - Beijing Baidu Netcom Science and Technology Co., Ltd., registered in CN, and announces 153 prefixes to 9 BGP neighbours. AS38365 has a reputation score of 13.9 (NEUTRAL); 646 of its 347,136 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 153
- BGP neighbours
- 9
- RPKI ROAs
- 304
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 13,059
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 2
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 7
- 42.199.240.0/22
- 106.12.0.0/19
- 106.12.0.0/18
- 106.12.32.0/19
- 106.12.64.0/20
- 106.12.80.0/20
- 106.12.64.0/18
- 106.12.96.0/20
- 106.12.112.0/20
- 106.12.128.0/20
- 106.12.144.0/20
- 106.12.128.0/18
- 106.12.160.0/20
- 106.12.176.0/20
- 106.12.192.0/20
- 106.12.192.0/19
- 106.12.208.0/20
- 106.12.224.0/21
- 106.12.224.0/20
- 106.12.232.0/21
- 106.12.240.0/23
- 106.12.240.0/21
- 106.13.0.0/19
- 106.13.0.0/18
- 106.13.32.0/20
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (2 total)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 304 ROAs.
- 101.247.0.0/17 · max length /24
- 103.6.76.0/22 · max length /24
- 106.12.0.0/18 · max length /24
- 106.12.128.0/18 · max length /24
- 106.12.192.0/19 · max length /24
- 106.12.224.0/20 · max length /24
- 106.12.240.0/21 · max length /24
- 106.12.250.0/23 · max length /24
- 106.12.64.0/18 · max length /24
- 106.13.0.0/18 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS38365.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 347,136
- Threat-listed addresses
- 646
- Threat density
- 0.1861 %
- Routed prefixes
- 141
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 9 of this network’s 9 BGP neighbours.
- CHINA169-BJ - China Unicom Beijing Province Network · AS4808
- CHINA169-Backbone - CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone · AS4837
- CHINAMOBILE-CN - China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd. · AS9808
- CHINANET-IDC-BJ-AP - IDC, China Telecommunications Corporation · AS23724
- CMNET-Jiangsu-AP - China Mobile communications corporation · AS56046
- CT-Guangzhou-IDC - CHINANET Guangdong province network · AS58466
- ChinaNet-NANJING-JISHAN-IDC - CHINANET Nanjing Jishan IDC network · AS134756
- CMNET-SCIDC-CN - The Internet Data Center of Sichuan Mobile Communication Company Limited · AS139080
- CHINANET-HEBEI-BAODING-MAN - CHINA TELECOM · AS140903
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS38365 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
13.9reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS38365 (Baidu - Beijing Baidu Netcom Science and Technology Co., Ltd., CN) has a reputation score of 62.1 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 61.8/100
- Graph metrics
- 65.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS38365 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.