Autonomous System
AS25019
Last fetched
AS25019 is operated by SAUDINETSTC-AS - Saudi Telecom Company JSC, registered in SA, and announces 3,276 prefixes to 36 BGP neighbours. AS25019 has a reputation score of 14.1 (NEUTRAL); 821 of its 5,667,840 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 3,276
- BGP neighbours
- 36
- RPKI ROAs
- 3,374
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,007
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 38
- Facilities
- 11
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 36
- Peer degree
- 1
- Provider degree
- 1
- 2.88.0.0/20
- 2.88.16.0/20
- 2.88.32.0/20
- 2.88.48.0/20
- 2.88.64.0/24
- 2.88.65.0/24
- 2.88.66.0/24
- 2.88.67.0/24
- 2.88.68.0/24
- 2.88.69.0/24
- 2.88.70.0/24
- 2.88.71.0/24
- 2.88.72.0/24
- 2.88.73.0/24
- 2.88.74.0/24
- 2.88.75.0/24
- 2.88.76.0/24
- 2.88.77.0/24
- 2.88.78.0/24
- 2.88.79.0/24
- 2.88.80.0/20
- 2.88.96.0/20
- 2.88.112.0/20
- 2.88.128.0/20
- 2.88.144.0/20
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.18
- Origin mismatches
- 1
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 3,374 ROAs.
- 104.114.192.0/19 · max length /19
- 184.26.96.0/22 · max length /22
- 23.204.82.0/23 · max length /23
- 23.204.84.0/22 · max length /22
- 23.206.230.0/23 · max length /23
- 23.215.140.0/22 · max length /22
- 23.215.208.0/22 · max length /22
- 23.34.84.0/22 · max length /22
- 23.39.200.0/21 · max length /21
- 23.41.48.0/20 · max length /20
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS25019.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 5,667,840
- Threat-listed addresses
- 821
- Threat density
- 0.0145 %
- Routed prefixes
- 1,970
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 36 BGP neighbours.
- SCHLUMBERGER-AS - Schlumberger Limited · AS72
- SLB-WESTERNGECO-AS - Schlumberger Limited · AS2567
- ACCENTURE - Accenture LLP · AS3573
- ARAMCO-AS - Aramco · AS5080
- Channels-STC - Channels By Saudi Telecom Company (STC) LLC · AS12529
- MOF-AS - Ministry of Finance of Saudi Arabia · AS21002
- NIC-SDAIA - NIC-SDAIA · AS35338
- Gateways-AOC - Arab Satellite Communications Organization · AS39064
- STC-IGW-AS - Saudi Telecom Company JSC · AS39386
- ALJAWWALSTC-AS - Saudi Telecom Company JSC · AS39891
- SFB-AS - Banque Saudi Fransi · AS41594
- TOPNET - Dar Al-Mustawred Trading Group Limited · AS42943
- MOHE-AS - Ministry of Education · AS44689
- SV-TAMKEEN - Saudi Arabian Airlines · AS48932
- NCB - Saudi National Bank JSC · AS48937
- amexas - American Express Company (Saudi Arabia) PJS · AS49257
- ALELM - Elm Company PJS · AS49474
- KSU - King Saud University · AS50517
- BHI - Baker Hughes Holdings LLC · AS54363
- ML-1432-54994 - Meteverse Limited. · AS54994
- MOFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs · AS57968
- MDA-AS - Authority of Developing Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah · AS60621
- ELD-AS-AP - Edgenext Legend Dynasty Pte. Ltd. · AS139057
- SUHUF-AS - Al Jazirah Corporation for Press, Printing, and Publishing · AS197994
- TASNEE - TASNEE National Company LTD · AS198406
Reputation
14.1reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS25019 (SAUDINETSTC-AS - Saudi Telecom Company JSC, SA) has a reputation score of 61.8 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 68.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Saudi Telecom Company JSC
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 25 Jun 2002 16:09:26 GMT
- Abuse contact
- registry@stc.com.sa
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS25019 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.