Autonomous System
AS34879
Last fetched
AS34879 is operated by CCT-AS - OOO "Sovremennye setevye tekhnologii", registered in RU, and announces 101 prefixes to 18 BGP neighbours. AS34879 has a reputation score of 8.4 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 25,600 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 101
- BGP neighbours
- 18
- RPKI ROAs
- 75
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 8,566
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 2
- Facilities
- 70
- Internet exchanges
- 11
- Customer degree
- 1
- Peer degree
- 30
- Provider degree
- 14
- 37.220.160.0/24
- 37.220.161.0/24
- 37.220.162.0/24
- 37.220.162.0/23
- 37.220.163.0/24
- 37.220.165.0/24
- 37.220.166.0/24
- 37.220.167.0/24
- 46.235.184.0/24
- 46.235.184.0/23
- 46.235.185.0/24
- 46.235.186.0/24
- 46.235.187.0/24
- 46.235.188.0/23
- 46.235.190.0/23
- 78.41.104.0/24
- 78.41.105.0/24
- 78.41.106.0/24
- 78.41.107.0/24
- 78.41.108.0/24
- 78.41.109.0/24
- 78.41.110.0/23
- 93.93.88.0/23
- 93.93.90.0/24
- 93.93.91.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (11 total)
Facilities (70 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Moscow M9
- Speedbone Berlin
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- Dataplex Budapest
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- NewTelco Kiev
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Sitel Bratislava
- LIM Warsaw
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Ucomline Kiev
- Moscow M10
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 75 ROAs.
- 185.17.168.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.17.169.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.17.170.0/23 · max length /24
- 195.208.64.0/20 · max length /24
- 195.209.192.0/20 · max length /24
- 195.209.64.0/24 · max length /24
- 195.209.65.0/24 · max length /24
- 195.209.66.0/24 · max length /24
- 195.209.67.0/24 · max length /24
- 195.209.68.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS34879.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 25,600
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 101
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 18 of this network’s 18 BGP neighbours.
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- MTS - MTS PJSC · AS8359
- CORBINA-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS8402
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- KAZTELECOM-AS - JSC Kazakhtelecom · AS9198
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- TRANSTELECOM - Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom · AS20485
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- KAR-TEL-AS - Kar-Tel LLC · AS21299
- UBN-AS - JSC "Ufanet" · AS24955
- CrimeaCom-LLC - CrimeaCom South LLC · AS28761
- MF-MGSM-AS - PJSC MegaFon · AS31133
- OPTIBIT-CDN - Optizon Ltd · AS43238
- TRUENETWORK - Truenetwork LLC · AS49673
- GNC-ALFA - GNC-Alfa CJSC · AS49800
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- CCT-M9P1 - OOO "Sovremennye setevye tekhnologii" · AS204878
- BYCOMAS - LLC BYCOM SYSTEMS · AS208407
Reputation
8.4reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS34879 (CCT-AS - OOO "Sovremennye setevye tekhnologii", RU) has a reputation score of 74.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 87.3/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- OOO "Sovremennye setevye tekhnologii"
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Fri, 22 Apr 2005 13:09:41 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@ngenix.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS34879 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.