Autonomous System
AS3786
Last fetched
AS3786 is operated by LGDACOM-KR - LG DACOM Corporation, registered in KR, and announces 910 prefixes to 398 BGP neighbours. AS3786 has a reputation score of 8.8 (REPUTABLE); 438 of its 8,665,856 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 910
- BGP neighbours
- 398
- RPKI ROAs
- 45
- MOAS conflicts
- 4
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 125
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 468
- Facilities
- 218
- Internet exchanges
- 18
- Customer degree
- 425
- Peer degree
- 152
- Provider degree
- 9
- 1.208.2.0/24
- 1.208.0.0/12
- 23.49.48.0/23
- 23.58.88.0/24
- 23.201.58.0/24
- 27.255.69.0/24
- 27.255.74.0/24
- 27.255.82.0/24
- 27.255.83.0/24
- 27.255.84.0/24
- 27.255.86.0/24
- 27.255.95.0/24
- 43.230.80.0/22
- 45.115.152.0/24
- 45.115.153.0/24
- 45.115.154.0/24
- 45.115.155.0/24
- 45.120.68.0/24
- 45.120.69.0/24
- 45.120.70.0/24
- 45.120.71.0/24
- 58.72.0.0/13
- 58.141.122.0/24
- 58.148.0.0/14
- 58.184.2.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.08
- Route leaks
- 3
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (18 total)
Facilities (218 total)
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Equinix LA2 - Los Angeles
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Dusseldorf DUS1-3
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 45 ROAs.
- 103.143.78.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.80.133.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.80.134.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.99.208.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.99.210.0/24 · max length /24
- 118.214.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 182.161.66.0/24 · max length /24
- 202.31.0.0/17 · max length /17
- 104.123.52.0/22 · max length /22
- 104.77.91.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS3786.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 8,665,856
- Threat-listed addresses
- 438
- Threat density
- 0.0051 %
- Routed prefixes
- 853
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 398 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- KPN - KPN B.V. · AS1136
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- KAIST-DAEJEON-AS-KR-KR - Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology · AS1781
- GREEN - green.ch AG · AS1836
- SCU-AS-KR-KR - Seoul Christain University · AS2563
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- RIPE-NCC-AS - Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) · AS3333
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- KRC-AS-KR-KR - Korea Rural Community Corporation · AS3608
- ETRI-AS-KR-KR - Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute · AS3748
- POSTECH-AS-KR-KR - Pohang University of Science and Technology · AS3784
- SOGANG-AS-KR-KR - Sogang University · AS3813
- ERX-NURI-ASN - I.Net Technologies Inc. · AS3976
- OTTOGI-AS-KR-KR - ottogi.co.kr · AS4202
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- ELIMNET-AS-KR-KR - ELIMNET, INC. · AS4663
- YONSEI-AS-KR-KR - Yonsei University · AS4665
- LGNET-AS-KR-KR - LG CNS · AS4668
- HYUNDAI-KR - Shinbiro · AS4670
- KTOA-AS-KR-KR - KTOA · AS4671
- KNPU1208-AS-KR-KR - Korea National Police University · AS4756
- CHOSUN-AS-KR-KR - Chosun ilbo Inc. · AS4790
MOAS / hijack watch
4 announced prefixes conflict with AS3786 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
8.8reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS3786 (LGDACOM-KR - LG DACOM Corporation, KR) has a reputation score of 73.6 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 84.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- LG DACOM Corporation
- RIR
- APNIC
- Abuse contact
- irt@nic.or.kr
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS3786 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.