Autonomous System
AS4837
Last fetched
AS4837 is operated by CHINA169-Backbone - CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone, registered in CN, and announces 2,175 prefixes to 123 BGP neighbours. AS4837 has a reputation score of 13.6 (NEUTRAL); 33,740 of its 57,728,000 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 2,175
- BGP neighbours
- 123
- RPKI ROAs
- 2,674
- MOAS conflicts
- 2
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 219
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 242
- Facilities
- 67
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 86
- Peer degree
- 52
- Provider degree
- 11
- 1.24.0.0/13
- 1.30.160.0/24
- 1.30.162.0/23
- 1.56.0.0/13
- 1.62.182.0/24
- 1.188.0.0/14
- 14.204.8.0/22
- 14.204.20.0/22
- 14.204.40.0/22
- 14.204.60.0/22
- 14.204.208.0/22
- 14.204.0.0/15
- 14.205.4.0/22
- 14.205.40.0/21
- 14.205.72.0/22
- 14.205.92.0/22
- 27.0.128.0/24
- 27.0.130.0/23
- 27.8.0.0/13
- 27.40.0.0/24
- 27.40.1.0/24
- 27.40.8.0/24
- 27.40.9.0/24
- 27.40.10.0/24
- 27.40.14.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.53
- Origin mismatches
- 5
- Route leaks
- 7
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN, TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER, TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (67 total)
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- FiberNet Telecom Group - 60 Hudson St
- MEGA-i (iAdvantage Hong Kong)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 2,674 ROAs.
- 1.188.0.0/14 · max length /14
- 1.24.0.0/13 · max length /13
- 1.30.160.0/24 · max length /24
- 1.30.162.0/23 · max length /23
- 1.56.0.0/13 · max length /13
- 1.62.182.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.16.0.0/12 · max length /12
- 101.199.196.0/22 · max length /22
- 101.199.196.0/23 · max length /23
- 101.199.198.0/23 · max length /23
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS4837.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 57,728,000
- Threat-listed addresses
- 33,740
- Threat density
- 0.0584 %
- Routed prefixes
- 1,523
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 123 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS701
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS702
- SWIPNET - Tele2 Sverige AB · AS1257
- CW - IDDQD-AS · AS1273
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- IIJ - Internet Initiative Japan Inc. · AS2497
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS3320
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- CHINANET-BACKBONE - No.31,Jin-rong Street · AS4134
- ERX-CERNET-BKB - China Education and Research Network Center · AS4538
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS - Globe Telecoms · AS4775
- CHINA169-BJ - China Unicom Beijing Province Network · AS4808
- CHINATELECOM-CORE-WAN-CN2 - China Telecom Next Generation Carrier Network · AS4809
- CEISTNET-AS-AP - The State Information Center of P.R.China · AS4859
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- Opentransit - Orange S.A. · AS5511
- SHAW - Shaw Communications · AS6327
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- ZAYO-6461 - Zayo Bandwidth · AS6461
- SEABONE-NET - TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. · AS6762
MOAS / hijack watch
2 announced prefixes conflict with AS4837 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
13.6reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS4837 (CHINA169-Backbone - CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone, CN) has a reputation score of 62.7 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 63.4/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- CNCGROUP IP network of ShangHai IDC
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:31 GMT
- Abuse contact
- zhaoyz3@chinaunicom.cn
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS4837 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.