Autonomous System
AS52091
Last fetched
AS52091 is operated by LEVEL-MSK-AS - Level-MSK Ltd., registered in RU, and announces 4 prefixes to 27 BGP neighbours. AS52091 has a reputation score of 8.1 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 768 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 4
- BGP neighbours
- 27
- RPKI ROAs
- 5
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 606
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 76
- Facilities
- 65
- Internet exchanges
- 11
- Customer degree
- 5
- Peer degree
- 32
- Provider degree
- 8
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (11 total)
Facilities (65 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Moscow M9
- Speedbone Berlin
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- Dataplex Budapest
- NewTelco Kiev
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- LIM Warsaw
- Sitel Bratislava
- Ucomline Kiev
- Moscow M10
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- TELEPOINT Sofia Centre
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 5 of this network’s 5 ROAs.
- 2a0d:df80::/29 · max length /29
- 2a0d:df80::/31 · max length /31
- 2a0d:df80::/48 · max length /48
- 31.133.40.0/23 · max length /24
- 31.133.42.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS52091.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 768
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 3
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 27 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- A1TELEKOM-AT - A1 Telekom Austria AG · AS8447
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- SFO-IX-AS - JSC "ER-Telecom Holding" · AS13094
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IHOME-AS - iHome LLC · AS25478
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
- iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
- INETCOM - INETCOM CARRIER LLC · AS35598
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- TELEMATIKA-AS - Telematika LLC · AS43201
- UMKAST - Umkast Media LLC · AS44660
- DIGITALONE-AS - DigitalOne AG · AS48158
- TRUENETWORK - Truenetwork LLC · AS49673
- W-IX_LTD - iHome LLC · AS50384
- TRANSROUTE - Transroute Telecom LTD · AS50509
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- GIGAHOST - Gigahost AS · AS56655
- RETNRU-AS - JSC "RetnNet" · AS57304
- TRINITY-AS - Trinity Ltd · AS59815
- EXASCALE - Exascale Ltd · AS61049
- BEMYLINK - BiMajLink d.o.o. · AS62255
Reputation
8.1reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS52091 (LEVEL-MSK-AS - Level-MSK Ltd., RU) has a reputation score of 75.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Level-MSK Ltd.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Fri, 15 Apr 2011 15:48:47 GMT
- Abuse contact
- spam@level-msk.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS52091 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.