Autonomous System
AS6619
Last fetched
AS6619 is operated by SAMSUNGSDS-AS-KR-KR - SamsungSDS Inc., registered in KR, and announces 125 prefixes to 22 BGP neighbours. AS6619 has a reputation score of 9.3 (REPUTABLE); 3 of its 1,294,592 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 125
- BGP neighbours
- 22
- RPKI ROAs
- 1
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 4,239
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 5
- Facilities
- 63
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 97
- Provider degree
- 15
- 4.35.69.0/24
- 8.30.92.0/24
- 8.35.94.0/23
- 8.37.192.0/24
- 8.43.66.0/23
- 63.124.78.0/23
- 65.215.97.0/24
- 112.106.53.0/24
- 112.106.0.0/16
- 112.107.53.0/24
- 112.107.81.0/24
- 112.107.83.0/24
- 112.107.0.0/16
- 112.108.0.0/16
- 121.253.0.0/16
- 122.101.0.0/16
- 123.32.0.0/18
- 123.37.0.0/16
- 123.41.0.0/16
- 157.197.68.0/24
- 157.197.69.0/24
- 157.197.70.0/24
- 157.197.72.0/24
- 157.197.74.0/24
- 157.197.76.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (7 total)
Facilities (63 total)
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix DA3 - Dallas
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- KINX Dogok
- MEGA-i (iAdvantage Hong Kong)
- Equinix SG1 - Singapore
- Global Switch Singapore
- Equinix LD4 - London, Slough
- Equinix SV2 - Silicon Valley, Santa Clara
- Equinix SV3 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix LD9 - London, Powergate
- Equinix NY7 - New York, North Bergen
- Equinix DA4 - Dallas
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 1 of this network’s 1 ROAs.
- 203.126.64.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS6619.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,294,592
- Threat-listed addresses
- 3
- Threat density
- 0.0002 %
- Routed prefixes
- 117
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 22 of this network’s 22 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS701
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- KDDI - KDDI CORPORATION · AS2516
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- SINGNET - SingNet · AS3758
- HKIX-RS1 - Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1 · AS4635
- KIXS-AS-KR-KR - Korea Telecom · AS4766
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T Enterprises, LLC · AS7018
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- SKB-AS-KR - SK Broadband Co Ltd · AS9318
- TTNET-MY - TIME dotCom Berhad No. 14, Jalan Majistret U1/26 Hicom Glenmarie Industrial Park 40150 Shah Alam Selangor, Malaysia · AS9930
- KINX-AS-KR - KINX · AS9957
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- SAMSUNGGROUP-KR - SamsungSDS Inc. · AS38130
- SAMSUNGCLOUDPLATFORM-AS-KR-KR - SamsungSDS Inc. · AS45985
- ORCL-CHICAGO-PP - Oracle Corporation · AS54253
- VOLVO-GROUP-IT-APNIC-AS-AP - VOLVO GROUP KOREA CO LTD, Construction Equipment Seoul · AS138380
Reputation
9.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS6619 (SAMSUNGSDS-AS-KR-KR - SamsungSDS Inc., KR) has a reputation score of 72.0 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- SamsungSDS Inc.
- RIR
- APNIC
- Abuse contact
- irt@nic.or.kr
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS6619 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.