Autonomous System
AS6697
Last fetched
AS6697 is operated by BELPAK-AS - Republican Unitary Telecommunication Enterprise Beltelecom, registered in BY, and announces 231 prefixes to 42 BGP neighbours. AS6697 has a reputation score of 13.3 (NEUTRAL); 551 of its 1,068,800 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 231
- BGP neighbours
- 42
- RPKI ROAs
- 41
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 814
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 51
- Facilities
- 80
- Internet exchanges
- 5
- Customer degree
- 36
- Peer degree
- 88
- Provider degree
- 10
- 37.44.64.0/18
- 37.45.0.0/16
- 37.45.128.0/17
- 37.212.0.0/21
- 37.212.8.0/21
- 37.212.16.0/22
- 37.212.20.0/22
- 37.212.24.0/21
- 37.212.32.0/21
- 37.212.48.0/21
- 37.212.56.0/21
- 37.212.64.0/22
- 37.212.76.0/22
- 37.212.80.0/21
- 37.212.88.0/21
- 37.212.196.0/22
- 37.212.200.0/22
- 37.212.0.0/14
- 37.214.0.0/21
- 37.214.8.0/21
- 37.214.16.0/21
- 37.214.24.0/21
- 37.214.32.0/21
- 37.214.40.0/21
- 37.214.56.0/21
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (5 total)
Facilities (80 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Moscow M9
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- NTT Frankfurt 1 Data Center (FRA1)
- NewColo Frankfurt
- Dataplex Budapest
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- NewTelco Kiev
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Equinix FR2 - Frankfurt, North
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 41 ROAs.
- 178.120.0.0/13 · max length /24
- 178.159.240.0/21 · max length /21
- 178.172.148.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.172.160.0/22 · max length /22
- 178.172.172.0/23 · max length /23
- 178.172.201.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.172.235.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.172.236.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.172.244.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.172.250.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS6697.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,068,800
- Threat-listed addresses
- 551
- Threat density
- 0.0516 %
- Routed prefixes
- 218
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 42 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- BN-AS - Business Network Ltd · AS12406
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- MTSBY-AS - Mobile TeleSystems JLLC · AS25106
- ASN-GLOBALONEBEL-CORE - JSC GLOBALONEBEL · AS28849
- CosmosTV-AS - COSMOS TV JLLC · AS31143
- Epam-AS - Epam Systems FLLC · AS33973
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- PRIORBANK-BY - Priorbank JSC · AS38980
- ITRANSITION-AS - ITRANSITION CJSC · AS41245
- A1-BY-AS - Unitary enterprise A1 · AS42772
- BPC-AS - JSC "Banks Processing Center" · AS44288
- MTI-NET - OJSC "Minsk Television Information Networks" · AS44397
- DIGITALONE-AS - DigitalOne AG · AS48158
- TKSWF-AS - Stadtwerke Feldkirch · AS48362
- GHU-AS - GHU-AS · AS49243
- PRIZMA-AS - Prizma Additional Liability Company · AS50176
- GARANT - GARANT · AS50334
- T1-Group-AS - "T1-Group" LLC · AS50593
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- Advanced-Technology-AS - Advanced-Technology-AS · AS50929
Reputation
13.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS6697 (BELPAK-AS - Republican Unitary Telecommunication Enterprise Beltelecom, BY) has a reputation score of 63.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 54.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 15 Apr 2002 17:12:05 GMT
- Abuse contact
- lir@belpak.by
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS6697 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.