Autonomous System
AS7497
Last fetched
AS7497 is operated by CSTNET-AS-AP - Computer Network Information Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CNIC-CAS), registered in CN, and announces 637 prefixes to 20 BGP neighbours. AS7497 has a reputation score of 11.0 (NEUTRAL); 6 of its 867,840 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 637
- BGP neighbours
- 20
- RPKI ROAs
- 1,072
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,855
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 9
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 20
- Provider degree
- 7
- 49.210.0.0/24
- 49.210.96.0/22
- 49.210.128.0/24
- 49.210.196.0/24
- 49.210.252.0/22
- 49.210.0.0/15
- 60.245.128.0/24
- 60.245.128.0/17
- 60.245.193.0/24
- 60.245.194.0/24
- 60.245.196.0/24
- 60.245.197.0/24
- 60.245.198.0/24
- 60.245.208.0/21
- 101.252.0.0/15
- 103.2.208.0/22
- 113.130.96.0/20
- 113.130.112.0/21
- 119.78.2.0/24
- 119.78.4.0/23
- 119.78.6.0/24
- 119.78.7.0/24
- 119.78.64.0/24
- 119.78.64.0/20
- 119.78.78.0/23
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.02
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 1,072 ROAs.
- 101.252.0.0/15 · max length /15
- 103.2.208.0/22 · max length /22
- 103.2.208.64/26 · max length /26
- 103.2.210.0/27 · max length /27
- 103.2.211.208/29 · max length /29
- 119.78.0.0/15 · max length /15
- 119.78.100.0/24 · max length /24
- 119.78.101.0/24 · max length /24
- 119.78.103.0/24 · max length /24
- 119.78.104.0/22 · max length /22
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS7497.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 867,840
- Threat-listed addresses
- 6
- Threat density
- 0.0007 %
- Routed prefixes
- 469
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 20 of this network’s 20 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- COGENT-1239 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS1239
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- CHINANET-BACKBONE - No.31,Jin-rong Street · AS4134
- ERX-CERNET-BKB - China Education and Research Network Center · AS4538
- HKIX-RS1 - Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1 · AS4635
- CHINA169-Backbone - CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone · AS4837
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- AARNET-AS-AP - Australian Academic and Research Network (AARNet) · AS7575
- CHINAMOBILE-CN - China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd. · AS9808
- TTNET-MY - TIME dotCom Berhad No. 14, Jalan Majistret U1/26 Hicom Glenmarie Industrial Park 40150 Shah Alam Selangor, Malaysia · AS9930
- GEANT - GEANT Vereniging · AS20965
- SINGAREN-GIX-AS-AP - Singapore Advanced Research and Education Network · AS23855
- CNGI-BJIX-AS-AP - China Next Generation Internet Beijing IX · AS23911
- CNNIC-CRITICAL-AP - China Internet Network Infomation Center · AS24151
- CNNIC-CRITICAL-AP - China Internet Network Infomation Center · AS24409
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- ZDNS - Internet Domain Name System Beijing Engineering Resrarch Center Ltd. · AS38345
- CNBIDCC - Beijing Beilong Yunhai Network Data Technology Corporation · AS63555
Reputation
11.0reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS7497 (CSTNET-AS-AP - Computer Network Information Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CNIC-CAS), CN) has a reputation score of 68.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 67.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- CNIC-CAS
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Mon, 09 Oct 2023 03:57:39 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse-ip@cstnet.cn
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS7497 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.