Autonomous System
AS8595
Last fetched
AS8595 is operated by WESTCALL-AS - OOO WestCall Ltd., registered in RU, and announces 53 prefixes to 52 BGP neighbours. AS8595 has a reputation score of 12.5 (NEUTRAL); 20 of its 78,848 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 53
- BGP neighbours
- 52
- RPKI ROAs
- 3
- MOAS conflicts
- 2
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 836
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 50
- Facilities
- 27
- Internet exchanges
- 5
- Customer degree
- 43
- Peer degree
- 13
- Provider degree
- 6
- 5.101.60.0/22
- 5.101.200.0/21
- 31.129.126.0/23
- 45.81.200.0/22
- 46.34.128.0/23
- 46.34.132.0/23
- 46.34.135.0/24
- 62.32.77.0/24
- 62.32.80.0/23
- 77.108.113.0/24
- 77.247.184.0/21
- 78.24.0.0/21
- 81.94.128.0/23
- 81.94.136.0/23
- 81.94.128.0/19
- 82.194.242.0/23
- 85.249.0.0/21
- 91.103.208.0/21
- 91.135.144.0/20
- 91.230.52.0/23
- 92.39.128.0/21
- 92.42.208.0/21
- 93.174.224.0/21
- 93.189.80.0/22
- 93.189.80.0/21
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (5 total)
Facilities (27 total)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Moscow M9
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- NewTelco Kiev
- CSS MPS Moscow
- Moscow M10
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
- LVRTC TV Tower
- Telia Telehouse KJJ
- Digita Helsinki Pasila Broadcasting Tower
- NewTelco Frankfurt
- IVC ORW Saint-Petersburg
- Tsvetochnaya Data Center
- Moscow TehnoGorod
- StoreData
- Raduga-2
- M100 datacenter Moscow, Varshavskoe 125
- IXcellerate MOS1
- DataSpace Moscow
- Miran-1
- DataLine Moscow DC OST
- DataLine Moscow DC NORD
- KIAEHOUSE
- INFONET DC
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 3 of this network’s 3 ROAs.
- 193.233.162.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.233.163.0/24 · max length /24
- 82.194.242.0/23 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS8595.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 78,848
- Threat-listed addresses
- 20
- Threat density
- 0.0254 %
- Routed prefixes
- 51
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 52 BGP neighbours.
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- QUANTUM - Quantum CJSC · AS12418
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- ASN-SFT - SFT Company LLC · AS25530
- Real-Estate-Hospitality-AS - Real Estate Hospitality Ltd. · AS28741
- RTS-TELECOM-AS - OOO "RTS Telecom" · AS29476
- MEDIA-PLUS-LLC - OOO WestCall Ltd. · AS33797
- NETWAY-AS - Netway ltd · AS33987
- SPACENET-AS - Internet-Cosmos LLC · AS34300
- INETCOM - INETCOM CARRIER LLC · AS35598
- SPB-BALTLINE-AS - Smart Telecom Limited · AS35631
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- SMART-TELEKOM-AS - OOO SMART-TELEKOM · AS41443
- CRYPTOPRO-AS - CryptoPro LTD · AS42024
- UN-AS - Sergei Volgapkin · AS42696
- TNS-RU-AS - OOO WestCall Ltd. · AS47925
- Optyma-AS - SPECIALIZED DESIGNER "OPTIMA" LLC · AS48050
- NAU-RA-AS - Nauchnye Razvlechenia Ltd. · AS49153
- Digitalcommunicationsstandards-AS - Digital communications standards LLC · AS49351
- LNTK - Lantek LLC · AS49825
- BUSINESSCENTER-AS - Buisiness Kvartal Nov Ltd. · AS50283
- TRANSROUTE - Transroute Telecom LTD · AS50509
- HITECH - STIS Engineering LLC · AS50608
MOAS / hijack watch
2 announced prefixes conflict with AS8595 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
12.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS8595 (WESTCALL-AS - OOO WestCall Ltd., RU) has a reputation score of 65.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 69.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- OOO WestCall Ltd.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Abuse contact
- abuse@westcall.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS8595 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.