Autonomous System
AS9929
Last fetched
AS9929 is operated by CUII - CHINA UNICOM Industrial Internet Backbone, registered in CN, and announces 396 prefixes to 20 BGP neighbours. AS9929 has a reputation score of 8.4 (REPUTABLE).
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 396
- BGP neighbours
- 20
- RPKI ROAs
- 492
- MOAS conflicts
- 4
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- 1.28.41.0/24
- 1.28.42.0/24
- 36.16.0.0/12
- 42.82.224.0/22
- 43.243.32.0/22
- 43.250.60.0/22
- 58.242.200.0/21
- 58.254.171.0/24
- 58.254.210.0/24
- 61.238.112.0/22
- 61.241.13.0/24
- 61.241.27.0/24
- 61.241.29.0/24
- 61.241.78.0/24
- 103.2.234.0/24
- 103.71.193.0/24
- 112.89.140.0/24
- 112.215.156.0/24
- 112.215.157.0/24
- 112.215.168.0/24
- 113.53.94.0/24
- 113.53.96.0/21
- 113.193.172.0/24
- 113.198.202.0/24
- 113.199.232.0/22
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.02
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN.
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 492 ROAs.
- 1.28.41.0/24 · max length /24
- 1.28.42.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.3.156.0/22 · max length /22
- 112.224.212.0/24 · max length /24
- 112.224.213.0/24 · max length /24
- 112.92.224.0/22 · max length /22
- 113.194.232.0/24 · max length /24
- 113.200.230.0/23 · max length /23
- 113.207.128.0/17 · max length /17
- 113.207.240.0/20 · max length /20
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS9929.
Blast radius
Blast radius is temporarily unavailable.
The threat-density procedure returned no result for this ASN. Refresh in a moment to retry — fresh data is fetched on the next visit.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 20 of this network’s 20 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS701
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS3320
- CHINANET-BACKBONE - No.31,Jin-rong Street · AS4134
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- CHINA169-BJ - China Unicom Beijing Province Network · AS4808
- CHINA169-Backbone - CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone · AS4837
- UNICOM-Global - China Unicom Global · AS10099
- CNCGROUP-SH - China Unicom Shanghai network · AS17621
- CNCGROUP-GZ - China Unicom Guangzhou network · AS17622
- CNCGROUP-SZ - China Unicom Shenzen network · AS17623
- CHINA169-GZ - China Unicom IP network China169 Guangdong province · AS17816
- Topway-Net - ShenZhen Topway Video Communication Co. Ltd · AS17962
- CDIH - Chengdu Information Harbor Co., Ltd · AS18242
- DellChina - Dell (China) Co.,Ltd · AS38057
- Dahe-network - Dahe tianchi (Beijing) network co. LTD · AS137794
- TESUCH-AS-AP - HK TESUCH GLOBAL CO., LIMITED · AS140591
- UNICOM-HEFEI-MAN - UNICOM AnHui province network · AS140726
- HJ-HIDDOS - Hebei Sea Whale Technology Co. Ltd. · AS151302
MOAS / hijack watch
4 announced prefixes conflict with AS9929 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
8.4reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS9929 (CUII - CHINA UNICOM Industrial Internet Backbone, CN) has a reputation score of 74.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 80.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- A9143CB3
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:30 GMT
- Abuse contact
- zhaoyz3@chinaunicom.cn
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS9929 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.