Autonomous System
AS19551
Last fetched
AS19551 is operated by INCAPSULA - Incapsula Inc, registered in US, and announces 1,640 prefixes to 226 BGP neighbours. AS19551 has a reputation score of 9.6 (REPUTABLE); 6 of its 233,728 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 1,640
- BGP neighbours
- 226
- RPKI ROAs
- 768
- MOAS conflicts
- 2
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 314
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 164
- Facilities
- 571
- Internet exchanges
- 79
- Customer degree
- 157
- Peer degree
- 276
- Provider degree
- 40
- 42.200.61.0/24
- 45.60.0.0/24
- 45.60.1.0/24
- 45.60.2.0/24
- 45.60.3.0/24
- 45.60.4.0/24
- 45.60.5.0/24
- 45.60.6.0/24
- 45.60.7.0/24
- 45.60.8.0/24
- 45.60.9.0/24
- 45.60.10.0/24
- 45.60.11.0/24
- 45.60.12.0/24
- 45.60.13.0/24
- 45.60.14.0/24
- 45.60.15.0/24
- 45.60.16.0/24
- 45.60.17.0/24
- 45.60.18.0/24
- 45.60.19.0/24
- 45.60.20.0/24
- 45.60.21.0/24
- 45.60.22.0/24
- 45.60.23.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.03
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN.
Signals
- ddos-mitigationProvides DDoS scrubbing or absorption for its customers.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (79 total)
Facilities (571 total)
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Equinix AT2/AT3 - Atlanta
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 768 ROAs.
- 103.77.142.0/24 · max length /24
- 113.211.166.0/24 · max length /24
- 113.211.167.0/24 · max length /24
- 122.11.196.0/24 · max length /24
- 124.108.137.0/24 · max length /24
- 124.108.149.0/24 · max length /24
- 134.159.88.0/24 · max length /24
- 157.20.106.0/24 · max length /24
- 157.20.107.0/24 · max length /24
- 166.81.2.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS19551.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 233,728
- Threat-listed addresses
- 6
- Threat density
- 0.0026 %
- Routed prefixes
- 913
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 226 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- ASN-TELSTRA - Telstra Limited · AS1221
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- NV-ASN - Cellcom Fixed Line Communication L.P · AS1680
- NEXTLAYER-AS - Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH · AS1764
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- XTOM-V-PS - xTom OU · AS3204
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS3320
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- INSTINET-AS - Instinet · AS3762
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- SPARK-NZ - Global-Gateway Internet · AS4648
- STARHUB-INTERNET - StarHub Ltd · AS4657
- TATACOMM-AS - TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP · AS4755
- INDOSAT-INP-AP - INDOSAT Internet Network Provider · AS4761
- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS - Globe Telecoms · AS4775
- TTSSB-MY - TM TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SDN. BHD. · AS4788
- LINTASARTA-AS-AP - PT Aplikanusa Lintasarta · AS4800
- VOCUS-BACKBONE-AS - Vocus Connect International Backbone · AS4826
- Opentransit - Orange S.A. · AS5511
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- SEABONE-NET - TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. · AS6762
MOAS / hijack watch
2 announced prefixes conflict with AS19551 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
9.6reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS19551 (INCAPSULA - Incapsula Inc, US) has a reputation score of 71.1 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 87.5/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Incapsula Inc
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Wed, 12 Jan 2011 21:26:45 GMT
- Abuse contact
- ww.dis.abuse@thalesgroup.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS19551 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.