Autonomous System
AS206264
Last fetched
AS206264 is operated by AMARUTU-TECHNOLOGY - Amarutu Technology Ltd, registered in SC, and announces 68 prefixes to 24 BGP neighbours. AS206264 has a reputation score of 18.2 (NEUTRAL); 381 of its 17,920 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 68
- BGP neighbours
- 24
- RPKI ROAs
- 78
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,491
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 7
- Facilities
- 214
- Internet exchanges
- 20
- Customer degree
- 6
- Peer degree
- 154
- Provider degree
- 10
- 2.57.214.0/24
- 2.57.215.0/24
- 5.61.208.0/24
- 5.61.209.0/24
- 5.183.209.0/24
- 5.187.35.0/24
- 5.187.38.0/24
- 5.187.39.0/24
- 31.220.0.0/22
- 31.220.40.0/23
- 45.74.41.0/24
- 45.115.25.0/24
- 45.129.84.0/24
- 45.139.122.0/24
- 45.155.91.0/24
- 80.251.152.0/24
- 80.251.153.0/24
- 85.202.80.0/24
- 87.83.234.0/24
- 89.42.231.0/24
- 89.249.49.0/24
- 93.123.72.0/24
- 94.156.33.0/24
- 103.28.88.0/24
- 103.28.89.0/24
Signals
- ddos-mitigationProvides DDoS scrubbing or absorption for its customers.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (20 total)
Facilities (214 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- NorthC Duesseldorf
- Moscow M9
- Speedbone Berlin
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- GlobalConnect Taastrup 1 (CPH1)
- Equinix HK1 - Hong Kong
- Digital Realty Dublin DUB1-2
- Digital Realty Madrid MAD1-2
- Digital Realty Copenhagen CPH1-3
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Dusseldorf DUS1-3
- EdgeConneX Munich (EDCMUC01)
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- BIT-1
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 78 ROAs.
- 103.109.100.0/22 · max length /22
- 103.109.102.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.217.252.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.217.253.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.28.88.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.28.89.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.46.141.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.47.147.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.55.10.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.55.8.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS206264.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 17,920
- Threat-listed addresses
- 381
- Threat density
- 2.1261 %
- Routed prefixes
- 63
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 24 of this network’s 24 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- SWIPNET - Tele2 Sverige AB · AS1257
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- NEXTLAYER-AS - Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH · AS1764
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- Opentransit - Orange S.A. · AS5511
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- TELENOR-SE - Telenor Sverige AB · AS8434
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- CTGNet - CTGNet · AS23764
- MYLOC-AS - WIIT AG · AS24961
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- NEWMEDIAEXPRESS-AS-AP - NewMedia Express Pte Ltd · AS38001
- HOSTCOLOR - Host Color · AS46873
- TKSWF-AS - Stadtwerke Feldkirch · AS48362
- SECUREBIT - Securebit AG · AS58057
- HOSTHATCH - HostHatch, LLC · AS63473
- GBNETWORK-AS-AP - GB Network Solutions Sdn. Bhd. · AS132372
- NetBlazer-Ltd - NetBlazer Ltd · AS200623
- am-ispsupport - ISP SUPPORT LLC · AS210677
- FnA - Maximum-Net LLC · AS213724
- STORMCLOUD-AS - Storm Industries LLC · AS219502
Reputation
18.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS206264 (AMARUTU-TECHNOLOGY - Amarutu Technology Ltd, SC) has a reputation score of 53.7 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 37.6/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Amarutu Technology Ltd
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 22 Feb 2017 16:23:15 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@koddos.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS206264 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.