Autonomous System
AS9541
Last fetched
AS9541 is operated by CYBERNET-AP - Cyber Internet Services (Pvt) Ltd., registered in PK, and announces 898 prefixes to 62 BGP neighbours. AS9541 has a reputation score of 18.7 (NEUTRAL); 6,021 of its 178,944 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 898
- BGP neighbours
- 62
- RPKI ROAs
- 6,261
- MOAS conflicts
- 11
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,393
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 25
- Facilities
- 324
- Internet exchanges
- 9
- Customer degree
- 24
- Peer degree
- 169
- Provider degree
- 12
- 14.1.104.0/24
- 14.1.105.0/24
- 14.1.106.0/24
- 14.1.107.0/24
- 36.255.32.0/24
- 36.255.33.0/24
- 36.255.34.0/24
- 36.255.35.0/24
- 36.255.40.0/24
- 36.255.41.0/24
- 36.255.42.0/24
- 36.255.43.0/24
- 36.255.44.0/24
- 36.255.44.0/23
- 36.255.45.0/24
- 36.255.46.0/24
- 36.255.47.0/24
- 43.242.101.0/24
- 43.242.103.0/24
- 58.65.192.0/24
- 58.65.193.0/24
- 58.65.194.0/24
- 58.65.195.0/24
- 58.65.196.0/24
- 58.65.197.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.11
- Route leaks
- 6
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (9 total)
Facilities (324 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Global Switch London East
- Global Switch London North
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 6,261 ROAs.
- 101.53.224.0/19 · max length /24
- 103.139.62.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.150.105.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.178.52.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.18.12.0/22 · max length /24
- 103.18.20.0/22 · max length /24
- 103.18.8.0/21 · max length /21
- 103.18.8.0/22 · max length /24
- 103.209.125.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.209.126.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS9541.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 178,944
- Threat-listed addresses
- 6,021
- Threat density
- 3.3647 %
- Routed prefixes
- 689
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 62 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- GREEN - green.ch AG · AS1836
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- OMANTEL-AS - Zain Omantel International FZ-LLC · AS8529
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- ITGATE - IT.Gate S.p.A. · AS12779
- NL-BIT - BIT BV · AS12859
- CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc. · AS13335
- CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc. · AS14789
- 15347 - IBEX Global Solutions · AS15347
- PKTELECOM-AS-PK - Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited · AS17557
- CONVERGE-AS - Converge ICT Solutions Inc. · AS17639
- TRANSTELECOM - Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom · AS20485
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- CTGNet - CTGNet · AS23764
- CYBERNET-APII - Cyber Internet Services Pakistan · AS24440
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IP-Max - IP-Max SA · AS25091
- IELO - IELO-LIAZO SERVICES SAS · AS29075
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- PROLEXIC-TECHNOLOGIES-DDOS-MITIGATION-NETWORK - Akamai Technologies, Inc. · AS32787
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
- HIVANE - Hivane Association · AS34019
MOAS / hijack watch
11 announced prefixes conflict with AS9541 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
18.7reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS9541 (CYBERNET-AP - Cyber Internet Services (Pvt) Ltd., PK) has a reputation score of 52.7 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 34.8/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Cyber Internet Services (Private) Limited
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:27 GMT
- Abuse contact
- noc-abuse@cyber.net.pk
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS9541 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.