Autonomous System
AS9678
Last fetched
AS9678 is operated by HOSTINGINSIDE-INTL - HostingInside LTD, registered in TW, and announces 24 prefixes to 17 BGP neighbours. AS9678 has a reputation score of 13.4 (NEUTRAL); 37 of its 5,120 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 24
- BGP neighbours
- 17
- RPKI ROAs
- 40
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,872
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 9
- Facilities
- 5
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 8
- Peer degree
- 5
- Provider degree
- 7
- 2.58.240.0/24
- 2.58.241.0/24
- 2.58.242.0/24
- 2.58.243.0/24
- 45.123.117.0/24
- 74.214.160.0/24
- 74.214.161.0/24
- 103.37.4.0/24
- 103.37.5.0/24
- 103.98.73.0/24
- 103.98.74.0/24
- 103.98.75.0/24
- 103.131.189.0/24
- 103.150.36.0/24
- 103.150.37.0/24
- 103.152.150.0/24
- 103.152.151.0/24
- 203.66.151.0/24
- 223.26.0.0/24
- 223.26.1.0/24
- 2401:95c0::/36
- 2401:95c0:ff00::/48
- 2401:95c0:ff01::/48
- 2403:cfc0:1004::/48
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.02
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 40 ROAs.
- 103.131.189.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.150.36.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.150.37.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.152.150.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.152.151.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.37.4.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.37.5.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.98.72.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.98.73.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.98.74.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS9678.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 5,120
- Threat-listed addresses
- 37
- Threat density
- 0.7227 %
- Routed prefixes
- 20
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 17 of this network’s 17 BGP neighbours.
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- BUNNY-COMMUNICATIONS-GLOBAL - Bunny Communications · AS5065
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- IOMART-AS - IOMART CLOUD SERVICES LIMITED · AS20860
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- OWO-NETWORK - OwO Network, LLC · AS30700
- nextdns - NextDNS, Inc. · AS34939
- MULTA-ASN1 - MULTACOM CORPORATION · AS35916
- PARADOXNETWORKS-LIMITED - ParadoxNetworks Limited · AS52025
- CMI-INT-HK - China Mobile International Limited · AS58453
- ZUSO - ZUSO Generation Co., Ltd. · AS63900
- AS-Digiwoker - SAELW(TAIWAN) CO., LIMITED · AS152610
- UWAYIO - UWay Information Technology Inc. · AS152624
- GCORE - G-Core Labs S.A. · AS199524
- Cyberzonehub - Cyberzone S.A. · AS209854
- luminabroadband - Lumina broadband UAB · AS215294
Reputation
13.4reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS9678 (HOSTINGINSIDE-INTL - HostingInside LTD, TW) has a reputation score of 63.2 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 47.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- HostingInside LTD
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS9678 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.