Autonomous System
AS199524
Last fetched
AS199524 is operated by GCORE - G-Core Labs S.A., registered in LU, and announces 573 prefixes to 212 BGP neighbours. AS199524 has a reputation score of 12.5 (NEUTRAL); 308 of its 115,968 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 573
- BGP neighbours
- 212
- RPKI ROAs
- 705
- MOAS conflicts
- 2
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 353
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 146
- Facilities
- 711
- Internet exchanges
- 99
- Customer degree
- 93
- Peer degree
- 4,035
- Provider degree
- 50
- 2.56.220.0/24
- 5.8.25.0/24
- 5.8.26.0/23
- 5.8.35.0/24
- 5.8.68.0/24
- 5.8.70.0/24
- 5.8.92.0/24
- 5.8.93.0/24
- 5.45.187.0/24
- 5.101.217.0/24
- 5.101.219.0/24
- 5.101.220.0/24
- 5.101.222.0/24
- 5.101.223.0/24
- 5.181.78.0/24
- 5.188.1.0/24
- 5.188.71.0/24
- 5.188.92.0/24
- 5.188.94.0/24
- 5.188.95.0/24
- 5.188.109.0/24
- 5.188.120.0/24
- 5.188.123.0/24
- 5.188.126.0/24
- 5.188.127.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.05
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.
Signals
- ddos-mitigationProvides DDoS scrubbing or absorption for its customers.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (99 total)
Facilities (711 total)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Telehouse - Paris 1 (Jeûneurs)
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Global Switch London North
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Global Switch London East
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Equinix DC7 - Ashburn, Vienna
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Equinix SV17 - Silicon Valley, Santa Clara
- Equinix ZH2 - Zurich
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 705 ROAs.
- 103.178.28.0/23 · max length /24
- 218.208.109.0/24 · max length /24
- 166.0.21.0/24 · max length /24
- 166.0.29.0/24 · max length /24
- 205.179.220.0/22 · max length /22
- 205.179.240.0/22 · max length /24
- 40.27.40.0/24 · max length /24
- 40.27.41.0/24 · max length /24
- 40.27.42.0/24 · max length /24
- 40.27.43.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS199524.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 115,968
- Threat-listed addresses
- 308
- Threat density
- 0.2656 %
- Routed prefixes
- 509
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 212 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- BACOM - Bell Canada · AS577
- ASN852 - TELUS Communications Inc. · AS852
- AKARI-NETWORKS - Akari Networks LLC · AS983
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- EBOX - EBOX · AS1403
- NEXTLAYER-AS - Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH · AS1764
- RCODEZERO-ANYCAST-SEC1-TLD - ipcom GmbH · AS1921
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS3320
- RIPE-NCC-AS - Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) · AS3333
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- STARHUB-INTERNET - StarHub Ltd · AS4657
- KIXS-AS-KR-KR - Korea Telecom · AS4766
- TTSSB-MY - TM TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SDN. BHD. · AS4788
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- Opentransit - Orange S.A. · AS5511
- HizliNet-Teknoloji - HizliNet Teknoloji A.S. · AS6205
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- SHAW - Shaw Communications · AS6327
MOAS / hijack watch
2 announced prefixes conflict with AS199524 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
12.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS199524 (GCORE - G-Core Labs S.A., LU) has a reputation score of 65.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 46.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 95.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- G-Core Labs S.A.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 10 Dec 2012 10:11:29 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@gcore.lu
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS199524 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.